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TRAINING FOR BARGAINING
JENNY ROBERTS* & RONALD F. WRIGHT**
ABSTRACT
While plea bargaining dominates the practice of criminal law,
preparation for trial remains central to defense attorneys training.
Negotiation is still peripheral to that training. Defense lawyers enter
practice with little exposure to negotiation techniques and strategies
in the plea bargaining context, the most significant skills they will
use every day.
Empirical research on plea negotiations has concentrated on out-
comes of negotiations rather than the process itself. Our multiphase
field study examines the negotiation techniques that attorneys use
during plea bargaining as well as their preparation and training for
negotiation. This Article explores the data on the training aspects of
our research. It then discusses implications of the failure to train for
bargaining by noting a variety of areas in which training might
improve case outcomes for defendants.
Surveys, interviews, and training agendas confirm our intuition
about the lack of training for bargaining: public defenders receive far
less training in negotiation skills and strategies than they do in trial
techniques. Some defenders receive limited training on negotiation
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skills in addition to trial skills, particularly when they first enter
their offices. The topic of negotiation, however, almost disappears
from the agenda for later training, even as trial skills remain front
and center.
Leaders in public defender offices allow this training gap to con-
tinue when they view negotiation as more an art than a science and
not susceptible to rigorous analysis or systematic training. The posi-
tion that negotiation cannot be taught is demonstrably false and
theoretically naïve. Formal negotiation learning has proven effective
in actual negotiations. Negotiation theory also offers more concrete
and comprehensive insights about sound practices than one can find
in case law related to constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel,
court rules and state statutes, or professional standards.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no novelty in placing guilty plea negotiations at the
center of criminal justice in the United States. These days, only a
tiny fraction of convictions come after a trial.1 Word has even
reached the U.S. Supreme Court. After decades of embarrassed and
backhanded discussion of plea bargains, the Court now confirms
what has long been obvious to system insiders: plea bargaining is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system.2 Indeed, the Court now squarely recognizes defense
counsels constitutional duty to function effectively in the plea bar-
gaining context,3 and ethics rules, professional standards, and other
norms of practice apply directly or indirectly to negotiation in crim-
inal cases.4
Yet plea bargaining is an underappreciated skill, particularly
given its central role in the criminal justice system. Consider this
scenario: A new criminal defense attorney approaches a prosecutor
in the hallway to discuss an ongoing assault case. Defense counsel
knows that the complaining witness is interested in restitution for
medical bills and an order that will keep the defendant away from
his workplace. The witness does not seem particularly interested in
having the defendant go to jail because he knows that then he will
never get compensated. But he has not told this to the prosecutor
yet because the prosecutor has not been in touch. Defense counsel
has heard that the prosecutor is a tough negotiator, and because she
really has no training on how to deal with a tough negotiator, she
1. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (Pleas account for nearly 95% of all
criminal convictions.).
2. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
3. Id. at 1407-08 ([C]riminal defendants require effective counsel during plea negotia-
tions.); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (During plea negotiations
defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel. (quoting McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 ([W]e have long recognized
that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.).
4. See infra Part III.D.2; see also Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional
Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 309, 319-22 (2013); Jenny Roberts,
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2665-69 (2013).
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decides to match the toughness by threatening to take the case to
trial and file a lot of motions if the prosecutor does not agree to an
acceptable plea bargain.
Some interesting research shows that fostering a positive mood
in a negotiation through tone can make the parties more creative
and more likely to use negotiation strategies that try to meet both
parties interestsa win-win approach.5 What if negotiation train-
ing had taught counsel that setting a positive mood could help
achieve the desired outcome, particularly given the opportunities for
problem-solving or integrative bargaining6 in the particular cir-
cumstances?
Although plea negotiations now dominate the practice of crimi-
nal law, skills relating only to trial remain central to the way
defense attorneys are trained for their work.7 Negotiation-specific
skills are still peripheral to that training.
The ability to try cases effectively will undoubtedly enhance the
ability to negotiate effectively. Further, many aspects of preparation
for trial, such as witness interviews and legal research, also prepare
the attorney for plea bargaining. However, there is some prepara-
tion that relates solely to bargaining, such as determiningbefore
entering the negotiationwhat information to share and what to
5. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH.
U. J.L. & POLY 13, 32 (2012) (citing various studies and noting how [t]he converse is also
truenegotiators in bad moods are more likely to be competitive); see also Robert J. Condlin,
Bargaining Without Law, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 310 (2012) (Dispute bargaining argu-
ment works best when it is conversational and not oratorical. The private, personal, and face-
to-face nature of the bargaining interaction makes it inappropriate for parties to make
speeches, score debaters points, or rely on the mannerisms and maneuvers of public oratory
to influence one another.) (footnote omitted).
6. Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1790
(2000) [hereinafter Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation] ([N]egotiators use
integrative tactics to create valuethat is, identify tradeoffs and options that will si-
multaneously make both parties better off.); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View
of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794 (1984)
(Problem solving is an orientation to negotiation which focuses on finding solutions to the
parties sets of underlying needs and objectives. The problem-solving conception subordinates
strategies and tactics to the process of identifying possible solutions and therefore allows a
broader range of outcomes to negotiation problems.). The converse is distributive bargaining,
which is the division of resources in a way that makes one party worse off to the same extent
that the other party is made better off. Russell Korobkin, Against Integrative Bargaining, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2008).
7. See infra Part II.B.
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withhold during the actual bargaining session.8 In short, defense
lawyers are training to operate in a trial-based world that does not
exist.9 A common explanation for this lack of negotiation training is
that some lawyers are innately good bargainers and others are not.
Though it is possible to pick up some tips by watching those gifted
in the art of bargaining, many believe that there is really no sys-
tematic way to think aboutand thus to teachplea bargaining.
The result is that criminal defense lawyers enter practice with
little exposure to negotiation techniques and strategies in the plea
bargaining context. While defenders quickly gain negotiation ex-
perience, particularly in a high-volume indigent defense practice,
they often do not reflect upon that experience in a systematic man-
ner that is designed to improve bargaining outcomes for clients.
Defenders also do not integrate intentional preparation for a specific
negotiation session into their routine practice. The training gap
directly affects defendants, who are represented by lawyers without
formal training in the negotiation process that produces the great
majority of convictions.10 As one scholar has described the problem,
the vast majority of lawyers have not received any training in the
most significant skill they use every day.11
While it is easy to see that a problem exists with a near exclusive
focus on trial-based attorney training, it is more difficult to know
the precise extent of that problem. Empirical research has so far
concentrated on the outcomes of plea negotiations rather than the
8. See infra Part III.C.2.
9. One former public defender noted: I was repeatedly told that the fastest road to
promotion was through establishing that I was not afraid to go to trial. Public defenders who
worked in courts with lower trial rates and/or who were master negotiators were not re-
warded for their good negotiating skills. Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Courts Failure
to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 610
n.302 (2014).
10. The data show only that most convictions come after a guilty plea, but it is safe to
assume that some type of negotiation precedes most guilty pleas. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (discussing
guilty plea statistics and noting that, [t]hough it is impossible to be sure, most of these pleas
probably resulted from plea bargains).
11. Charles B. Craver, Sharpening Your Legal Negotiating Skills, 56 PRAC. LAW. 61, 61
(2010) (Public and private professional development groups try to fill this void through half-
day and full-day negotiation programs, but most attorneys prefer to obtain their professional
development credits through more traditional courses.).
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negotiation process itself.12 When it comes to discussions between
defense counsel and the prosecution, along with the preparation
and training that led up to that bargaining, the empirical research
is thin. In particular, we have discovered no empirical studies of
defender training for negotiation.13
This Article reports the first data from a long-term empirical
study of the bargaining part of plea bargains. Our field study
attempts to map the negotiation practices that happen during
criminal plea bargaining in light of well-established insights from
negotiation theory. Several different sources contribute to this
study, including field interviews of public defenders, responses to an
online survey (relevant portions of which are attached as an Appen-
dix to this Article), and a content analysis of the training agendas
for programs typically available to assistant public defenders in the
different jurisdictions surveyed.
In this Article, we explore the training, if any, that public defen-
ders receive on actual negotiation skills, compared to the training
they receive on trial skills. In Part I, we summarize some of the ne-
gotiation literature, focusing on the small body of work that applies
negotiation theory to the plea-bargaining context. Part II reports on
the survey and other data from our field study that relates to
negotiation training and preparation. The results show how some
public defenders do receive limited training in negotiation skills in
addition to trial skills, particularly when they first enter their
offices.14 The topic of negotiation, however, almost disappears from
the agenda for public defenders in their continuing legal education,
even as trial skills remain front and center.15 The mutually rein-
12. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CANT REFUSE: HOW U.S. FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQV6-MS6J]; Nancy J.
King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea,
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005).
13. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.B.1. Private and assigned counsel in criminal cases may get even less
training than public defenders and would surely also benefit from negotiation training. While
this phase of the study does not include those other groups, the claims about training apply
to them as well as to public defenders. Further, while it is certainly worthwhile to study pro-
secutor training for bargaining, and we may undertake that more challenging data collection
in the future, this first phase of our empirical inquiry focuses solely on public defenders.
15. See infra Part II.B.2.
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forcing sources from this field study confirm that public defenders
receive far less training in negotiation skills and strategies than
they do in trial techniques, despite the dominance of negotiation in
practice.
In Part III, we argue that this training deficit matters in practice.
The attorneys survey responses reveal various defense practices
that could improve after training based on mainstream insights
from negotiation theory.16 Improved defense attorney performance
during the preparation phase and during the negotiation process
itself could change outcomes for some defendants.17 Part III also of-
fers several examples of negotiation-specific training, drawn from
widely accepted and studied techniques and practices in negotiation
literature. These include training about negotiation strategies and
styles, understanding the concepts of Best Alternative to a Nego-
tiated Agreement (BATNA) and anchoring, and using data to
establish objective negotiation criteria.18
Leaders in public defender offices allow the gap in training to
continue when they believe that negotiation is more an art than a
science and not susceptible to rigorous analysis or systematic learn-
ing.19 The position that negotiation cannot be taught is demonstra-
bly false and theoretically naïve. There is an entire world of formal
negotiation learning, a discipline that has developed now for gener-
ations.20 The theory has proven effective in actual negotiations.21
16. Later publications will examine defender responses to survey questions about actual
bargaining practices (a section that makes up the bulk of the survey). That analysis will ad-
dress the extent to which defense attorney bargaining practices in different court and crime
settings reflect the insights of negotiation theory. An abbreviated discussion of some respons-
es in that section of the survey is included in this Article, because those responses illustrate
how inadequate training might affect actual bargaining practices. See infra Parts III.A-C.
17. Another way to analyze whether negotiation training (and thus lack of it) matters is
to determine if it leads to more client satisfaction with the plea bargaining process. See
Michael M. OHear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 412 (2008)
(The social psychology research indicates that implementing procedural justice norms ... may
increase defendant satisfaction with plea-bargained outcomes.); cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEO-
PLE OBEY THE LAW 6-7 (2006) (describing how procedural justice, or fair process, leads to
greater satisfaction among those involved in the process, regardless of outcome).
18. See infra Parts III.A-C.
19. See infra Part II.B.4.
20. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Pracademics: Making Negotiation Theory Implemented,
Interdisciplinary, and International, 1 INTL J. CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT & RESOL. 188, 189
(2013); see also infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence
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Negotiation theory also offers more concrete and comprehensive
insights about sound practices than one can find in case law related
to constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel, court rules and
state statutes, ethical rules, and professional standards.22
One of the few surveys of defense counsels views on effective ne-
gotiation skills opined that good relations with the prosecutor are
not nearly as important as many believe.23 The authors concluded
that defense lawyers with good negotiation skills can obtain
favorable plea bargains even if they do not get along well with their
opponents.24 This insight reveals the transferable and generalizable
nature of negotiation skills. They are not limited to just a few per-
sonality types and do not assume an unusually receptive prosecutor
as a negotiating partner. Although public defenders may be dealt a
weak hand in many cases, training focused on negotiation skills
could help them get the best results from those cards.
I. THEORY AND EMPIRICAL TESTING OF PLEA NEGOTIATION
Negotiation is a relatively new field for academic inquiry. The
topic is interdisciplinary, drawing on fields ranging from economics
to anthropology.25 The study of negotiation finds its roots in studies
of labor markets in the 1920s and other business markets in the
1960s, but beginning in the late 1970s, legal and other academics
turned their attention to the topic.26
In 1978, Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton published The Lawyering
Process: Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy, which
on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 148-49 (2002). See gener-
ally GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983).
22. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-242(f) (stating that the court, the States Attorney, the attorney for
the defendant, or any combination thereof must advise the defendant about immigration
and sex offender consequences of a conviction before the court accepts a guilty plea); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50 (McKinney 2015) (governing entry of guilty pleas); Missouri v. Frye,
132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (describing Sixth Amendment duty to advise client about written
offer from prosecution); MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASSN 2014);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY §§ 14-1.1 to 14-1.4 (AM. BAR ASSN 1999).
23. Robert L. Doyel, The National College-Mercer Criminal Defense Survey: Some Prelim-
inary Observations About Interviewing, Counseling, and Plea Negotiations, 37 MERCERL. REV.
1019, 1024 (1986).
24. Id.
25. See Schneider, supra note 20, at 193.
26. See id. at 189.
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included a thorough exploration of negotiation literature.27 In 1981,
Roger Fisher and William Ury published Getting to Yes, a best-sell-
ing book that introduced generations of students to the concept of
principled negotiation through nonadversarial bargaining.28 Within
law schools, Harvard Law Schools Program on Negotiation was
founded in 1983,29 and the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution
is now in its thirty-first year of publication.30
Like any other subject of social science inquiry, the field of nego-
tiation operates through a dialogue between theory and empirical
testing. General theoretical accounts grow first from preliminary
observations about the field, and empirical testing confirms or re-
futes different aspects of the theory. That empirical evidence makes
it possible to refine the general theoretical accounts of the topic.
While that dialogue has proceeded for the field of negotiation as
a whole, the special context of plea bargaining in criminal cases has
not yet attracted much attention. The empirical literature on the
27. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 445-64 (1978). Three years later, the authors drew on that work
and reorganized the negotiation sections to be used in a separate course on negotiation or as
one piece of a broader examination of lawyering skills, whether in a clinical context or
elsewhere in the law school curriculum. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING
PROCESS: NEGOTIATION, at xvii (1981). For a similarly notable early work on legal negotiation,
see Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31
U. KAN. L. REV. 69, 72 (1982) (This Article is intended as a beginning step in legal analysis
of the negotiation process, the behavior of lawyer negotiators, and societys efforts to regulate
the rules by which we bargain.).
28. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM R. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1st ed. 1981); see also Leslie Kaufman, Roger D. Fisher, Expert at Get-
ting to Yes, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/world/
americas/roger-d-fisher-expert-in-getting-to-yes-dies-at-90.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BK8M-
KLLN] (noting that Getting to Yes has sold millions of copies, been translated into thirty-six
languages, and been used by business and government leaders). In 1984, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow published her influential academic article, Toward Another View of Legal Negotia-
tion: The Structure of Problem Solving. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6.
29. Welcome to the Program on Negotiation, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.pon.harvard.edu/
about/ [https://perma.cc/RLV7-NMV2] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
30. See Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, About Us, OHIO ST. U. MORITZ C. L.,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjdr/about-the-jdr/news-announcements/ [https://
perma.cc/T6GL-5CFR] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016); see also Condlin, supra note 5, at 282 (The
last three decades have been fertile ones for legal dispute bargaining theory.) (footnote omit-
ted); Schneider, supra note 20, at 189 (Negotiation theory as a separate field really started
in the late 1980s, when negotiation classes became stand-alone classes at many law and bus-
iness schools.).
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topic is particularly thin.31 For instance, the training and prepara-
tion of defense lawyers for plea bargaining remain unmapped terri-
tory. Likewise, the actual practices of defense lawyers during plea
negotiations have generated mostly anecdotal observations rather
than systematic academic study.32 Our understanding of guilty plea
negotiations, therefore, must extrapolate from an established litera-
ture on negotiation more generally. The most promising designs for
training programs for defense lawyers begin with a few scholarly
explorations of teaching and training about negotiation generally.
The theoretical literature, applying insights about negotiation to
plea bargaining, has progressed a bit further than the empirical
work in the field. Nevertheless, it is recent and remains underdevel-
oped. In 1997, one author noted that, no legal scholar has yet to
explicitly apply bargaining analysis to the field of criminal law.33
Ten years later, there was still remarkably little cross-fertilization
between the fields.34 Major negotiation textbooks pay little to no
attention to plea bargaining. For example, Russell Korobkins well-
respected Negotiation Theory and Strategy has two references to
Criminal cases in the Index (with a total discussion of roughly five
pages relating to those references) and one reference to plea bar-
gaining (with a half-page discussion on The Power of Patience in
Plea Bargaining).35
31. For some early efforts in plea bargaining empiricism, see MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1977)
(discussing the bargaining process and concessions as bureaucratic in the misdemeanor con-
text, with more offers and counteroffers in felony cases), and ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD
CRESSY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 85-144 (1976).
32. One early survey in the field examined negotiation practices. See Doyel, supra note
23. Pamela Utz studied bargaining practices in the 1970s in two California counties: San
Diego and Alameda. See PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION
IN CRIMINAL COURT (1978); cf. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defen-
dants Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargainings Innocence Problem, 103
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013).
33. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note, Getting to Guilty: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation,
2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 118 n.18 (1997). But see Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based
Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 73-82 (1985) (applying
his context-based theory of negotiation to several illustrative contexts, including plea bargain-
ing).
34. Michael M. OHear & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute Resolution in Criminal Law,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (noting that plea bargaining would seem a natural area for col-
laboration and dialogue between students of criminal law and dispute resolution).
35. RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 161, 480 (3d ed. 2014).
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One early theoretical work came from Donald Gifford, who placed
guilty plea negotiations into an overall framework for analyzing ne-
gotiation. He argued in 1985 that the context of a negotiation can
determine which strategycompetitive, cooperative, integrative, or
a combinationa negotiator should choose.36 He applied this theory
to several different contexts, one of which was plea bargaining.37
Ten years later, Rodney Uphoff published the most comprehen-
sive examination of negotiation practices in criminal plea bar-
gaining.38 Uphoff noted the dearth of materials for teaching plea
bargaining and undertook to examine the skill of negotiating or
plea bargaining from the perspective of the criminal defense
lawyer.39 His goal was to offer an approach to plea bargaining that
was grounded both in the theoretical literature about negotiation
strategy and in the realities of criminal practice, client behavior
and other salient aspects of the criminal justice system.40 He
argued that plea negotiations take place within a tension between
the rational interests of the playersincluding the defendant, the
prosecutor, the judge, and the defense attorneyand the ethical
obligations of the defense lawyer.41
The theoretical framework for plea negotiations began to shift in
the late 1990s and 2000s, as scholars incorporated insights from
behavioral law and economics to identify relevant influences on
actors in the plea bargaining process.42 Influenced by social psy-
chology, this literature generally does not undertake empirical
36. Gifford, supra note 33, at 44.
37. See id. at 73-82.
38. Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995).
39. Id. at 73. In its current catalogue of teaching materials, the Harvard Law Schools
Project on Negotiation includes several plea bargaining simulations. See Program on Negotia-
tion, Teaching Materials & Publications: Law/Courts Negotiation, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.
pon.harvard.edu/shop/category/law-courts-negotiation/ [https://perma.cc/PN26-NCTS] (last
visited Mar 20, 2016).
40. Uphoff, supra note 38, at 75.
41. Id. at 75-76. Shortly after the publication of Uphoff s work, a Note in the Harvard
Negotiation Law Review explored the intersection of plea bargaining with three main concepts
from negotiation theory: practitioner evaluation of options and alternatives, the influence of
attorney incentives and motivations, and how relationships of the parties affect plea outcomes
and dynamics. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 33, at 121, 147.
42. Cf. Bibas, supra note 10, at 2467, 2496 & n.133, 2497-98, 2499 & n.138, 2500-12, 2530
& n.296, 2547 (relating bargaining to behavioral law and economics theory, and discussing
the evolution of the doctrine in this context).
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examination of bargaining. Instead, it offers a framework for future
empirical work to move beyond earlier studies that viewed plea
bargaining through a rational actor lens.43 This lens led researchers
to focus too heavily on factors such as strength of evidence and like-
lihood of conviction. The social psychological approach, by contrast,
explains perception and decision making as a function of myriad
individual and social factors.44 This more recent literature applies
that decision-making frame to the plea bargaining process at the
theoretical level.45
This recent shift in the theoretical framework for plea negotia-
tions has little corresponding empirical literature to test and refine
its contours.46 We found no recent empirical inquiry into defender
negotiation training and little exploration of defender preparation
for specific bargaining sessions.47
43. See, e.g., id. at 2496; Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 205, 219; Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1605, 1632 (2006); cf. Chad
Oldfather, Heuristics, Biases, and Criminal Defendants, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 249, 249-50 (2007)
(cautioning that behavioral economics research may not apply in the same manner to indi-
viduals facing criminal charges as it does to individuals in other situations).
44. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2007).
45. In 2007, Marquette Law School organized a Conference on Plea Bargaining. The
Marquette Law Review dedicated its first issue in Volume 91 to the topic, with a number of
articles applying insights from behavioral law and economics and negotiation theory to plea
bargaining. See Symposium, Dispute Resolution in Criminal Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2007);
see also OHear & Schneider, supra note 34, at 1 (describing conference and resulting articles);
Dispute Resolution in Criminal Law 2007, MARQ. L. REV., http://scholarship.law.marquette.
edu/mulr_conferences/disputeresolutionincriminallaw2007/ [https://perma.cc/2CEU-DJTT]
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
46. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 44, at 174 (Because there is no empirical data
on the way that the particular factors I consider below actually affect the behavior of prose-
cutors and defense attorneys in the plea bargaining setting, what follows are hypotheses that
prior literature supports, but that no data has verified.). For two of the few recent empirical
studies to apply negotiation theory to plea bargaining, see Deirdre Bowen, Calling Your Bluff:
How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt Plea Bargaining Strategies to Increased For-
malization, 26 JUST. Q. 2, 7 (2009) (examining plea negotiations in forty-two felony cases
using ethnographic method, including interviews), and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating
or Caving In: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd or Exploited in Plea Bargaining Negotiations?,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 145, 160 (2007).
47. Studies of defender preparation for bargaining are quite dated. See, e.g., Doyel, supra
note 23; Marty Lieberman, Note, Investigation of Facts in Preparation for Plea Bargaining,
1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 557, 561, 568 tbl.1 (The interviewers asked the attorneys specific ques-
tions concerning preparation for their most recent felony or misdemeanor cases that went to
trial or resulted in guilty pleas.).
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Why does plea bargaining get so little attention as a matter of
negotiation theory? Some negotiation scholars suggest that nego-
tiation in criminal proceedings is so different from negotiation in
civil litigation that general observations might not apply to that con-
text.48 The power imbalance between the prosecutor and the defense
attorney make the insights from civil litigation suspect in this set-
ting. Negotiations in criminal cases, in this view, are completely
distributivedividing the pie into pieces rather than making the pie
larger. However, a closer look at plea bargaining reveals more vari-
ety and more room for defense counsel to make an impact.49
II. A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC DEFENDER NEGOTIATION
METHODS
The field study we designed for this project documents current
practices of defense attorneys related to plea negotiations. We focus
on aspects of practice that could test current theories of negotiation
in the plea-bargaining context and suggest new areas for empirical
study. This survey data can also inform the conversation about
closer regulation of plea bargaining currently taking place among
courts, bar associations, national organizations that draft stan-
dards, and practitioners.
48. See Alkon, supra note 9, at 608 (Plea bargaining is all too often not much of a
negotiation.); cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation in Popular Culture: What Are We
Bargaining For?, in 7 LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 583, 591-92 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005)
(Negotiation in the criminal context is regarded as a weaker, selling-out sort of justice, not
the real thing of contested and dramatic trials and not the same use of power, tricks and
manipulations of depicted civil negotiations.) (footnote omitted). But see Batra, supra note
4, at 323 (While it may seem strange to apply general negotiation theory to plea bargains,
courts themselves consider a plea as a bargain struck by two independent parties, treat the
plea agreement as a contract, and see the bargaining as a type of contractual transaction.
Legal scholars have also viewed plea agreements as another form of negotiated dispute
resolution.) (footnotes omitted); Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 33, at 121 (Although
negotiation in the criminal context is fraught with legal constraints and power imbalances,
case law and legal scholarship support the notion that plea agreements represent mutually
beneficial negotiated outcomes.).
49. See infra Part II.B.5.
2016] TRAINING FOR BARGAINING 1459
A. Methods
This field study involves several mutually reinforcing sources of
evidence. First, we conducted fifteen interviews of public defenders
who work in eight offices in four different states. Before conducting
the interviews, we obtained the permission of the chief public defen-
der for the jurisdiction. These field interviews lasted thirty to sixty
minutes; we recorded and transcribed them for qualitative analysis.
We used the interviews to refine survey questions in light of typical
office policies, any informal rules of bargaining, and local norms of
sentencing.
After completing the interviews, we developed an online survey
for public defenders. We pretested the instrument with academic
colleagues who are former defenders. Again with the permission of
the chief public defender in each relevant jurisdiction, we distrib-
uted the survey to 1137 attorneys, working in twenty-six offices in
nine states. An attorney from the leadership in each office sent an
e-mail to staff attorneys just before the arrival of the survey link,
saying that the leadership encouraged but did not require comple-
tion of the survey. Our survey was anonymous.
Responses came from 314 attorneys, for a response rate of 28%.
Of those responding attorneys, 45% were female. Among those
who indicated race or ethnicity, 83% were Caucasian, 9% African
American, 5% Asian, 5% Hispanic, 2% Native American or Pacific
Islander, and 5% Other.50
In terms of seniority, 33% of the respondents had less than five
years of experience as defense attorneys. One quarter had experi-
ence between five and ten years, 21% had between eleven and twen-
ty years, and 20% had more than twenty years of experience. A
handful (11%) worked as prosecutors at some point before taking
their current positions as a public defender.
As for their current assignments, we asked the attorneys to esti-
mate the percentage of their caseloads devoted to misdemeanor
matters, general felony matters, specialized felonies such as homi-
cide or sex offenses, and other matters such as juvenile or appellate
work. We categorized attorneys by the predominant type of cases
50. These categories total more than 100% because the survey allowed respondents to
indicate more than one race.
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they carry, placing into a caseload category any attorneys who
spend more than half of their efforts on that type of case. This pro-
cess gave us a breakdown of 27% misdemeanor attorneys, 35%
general felony attorneys, 11% specialized felony attorneys, and 28%
with some other type of caseload.
The participating offices employed as many as two hundred nine-
ty and as few as three attorneys; eight of the twenty-six offices were
larger offices that employed twenty-five or more attorneys. We also
selected seven offices that were funded and controlled at the local
level, while nineteen others were funded and controlled at the state
level.51 The local offices tended to be larger offices in major urban
areas.
In addition to our semistructured interviews and the survey in-
strument, we also collected the published (and, in some instances,
unpublished) agendas for attorney training sessions in the jurisdic-
tions where we distributed the survey. We looked to these training
agendas for insight about how much training occurs in a formalized
setting and how much occurs through informal discussion or
observation. The agendas also allowed us to check the accuracy of
attorney answers to questions about the amount and nature of
training available to them.
B. The Absence of Formal Training
The interviews, surveys, and training agendas all pointed in a
single direction: public defenders receive far more training about
trial techniques than they do about negotiation techniques. The
same rationales that support training in trial techniques should
apply at least as much to negotiation skills and strategies, but
public defenders currently do not benefit from much formal training
on the latter subjects. This deficit between trial training and ne-
gotiation training holds true for both new and veteran attorneys. In
this Part, we review the formal training available to attorneysas
51. See generally DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS [BJS], U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE [DOJ], NCJ 231175, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DE-
FENDER OFFICES, 2007 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TD4P-RFNS]; LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BJS, DOJ, NCJ 228229, STATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WP6D-E4QE].
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reflected in survey responses and in published training agendas
along with the limited efforts at preparation for negotiation that
public defenders report. Finally, we consider the reasons why train-
ing and preparation for bargaining receive so little attention during
the formation of defense attorneys as competent professionals.
1. Training for New Attorneys
Our survey asked several questions about the training that public
defenders received on negotiation techniques or strategies. The res-
ponses suggest that more training opportunities are available for
new public defenders than for more experienced attorneys.52
About 26% of the attorneys reported that they received no train-
ing at all as newcomers to the public defenders office. The median
number of days devoted to training for new attorneys was five.
Attorneys with below-median days of new attorney training were
just as likely to work in large offices as they were to work in small
offices. The same is true of state-run offices compared to locally-run
offices: there were no statistically significant differences between
these types of offices.
Among the public defenders who received any training upon
arrival in their offices, 41% said that none of the training for new
attorneys related to negotiation skills and preparation for bargain-
ing, while 58% reported five or fewer hours related to those topics.53
The new attorneys who engaged in training spent some of that
training time observing more experienced attorneys during plea ne-
gotiations,54 but that observation time was minimal. Although 39%
of the new attorneys who received training spent no time observing
52. See Interview with Public Defender A [hereinafter Interview with A] ([W]e had a
specific training called pleas and sentencing which kind of discussed the negotiation process
and the sentencing process.... [New attorney training] does have a formal plea negotiating
session.).
53. Because only 74% of the attorneys received some training at the time of arrival, a total
of 69% of all attorneys received between zero and five hours of negotiation training.
54. See Interview with Public Defender B [hereinafter Interview with B] (So part of my
training entails telling them that its not because I do it one way that they have to do it the
same way. But they witness my conversations with states attorneys prior to court dates, on
the court dates, and how I continue negotiating pleas in the middle of the docket because plea-
negotiations is an on-going process ... up until you get whatever you want. So that can take
a long time.).
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experienced attorneys negotiating, those who did observe negotia-
tions spent a median of two hours doing so. Attorneys working in
small public defender offices reported longer hours of observing
negotiations: sixteen hours on average, as opposed to seven hours
for larger offices.55
Our interviewees confirmed that training specifically for negotia-
tion is not common. Referring to one statewide training program, an
interviewee reported that five years ago there was zero training on
negotiation, nothing on plea bargains, nothing at all.56 Another sug-
gested that trials interfere with training for bargaining: Well, one
of the problems we have in [this county] is we dont get to go to a lot
of those [statewide training programs on plea bargaining] because
were in trial.57 The limited training on guilty pleas tends to be
crime-specific rather than more general training about negotiation
techniques:
The misdemeanor [training] is in the fall and the felony is in the
spring and they put on our PDs conference every year. That
usually doesnt talk about plea-bargaining very much, there may
be one topic about that.... Its usually like, plea-bargaining in
domestic violence cases. You know how do you address the
specific issues of domestic violence when youre talking to a pro-
secutor who knows all about domestic violence cases. You know
or plea-bargaining in mental health cases where there is [a] real
mental health issue.... So its probably more focused on the topic
rather than actual plea-bargaining.58
55. We hypothesize that the case volume demands in larger offices make the shorter
observation periods necessary. This difference between larger and smaller offices is statis-
tically significant using the t-test for significance at the p = 0.05 level. All other differences
between groups reported in this Article are also statistically significant according to this
measure.
56. See Interview with B, supra note 54; see also Interview with Public Defender C (Ive
been to the new misdemeanor defender training. I dont think it did [cover any negotiation
topics].); Interview with Public Defender D [hereinafter Interview with D] (I actually did one
or two trainings where I talked about negotiation and just an informal [discussion] because
I was never trained. So we did do that about five or six years ago but I dont think its been
done since then.).
57. Interview with D, supra note 56.
58. Interview with Public Defender E.
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2. Formal Training After Orientation
After the initial period of orientation for new attorneys, the
amount of training devoted to negotiation skills drops even lower.
More than half of all attorneys in every type of office reported zero
hours of training about negotiation skills in a typical year after their
arrival in the office. On average, more experienced attorneys
received three hours of training per year directed toward negotia-
tion.59
Again, the interviews confirmed that negotiation is not a promi-
nent topic in the formal training sessions for veteran attorneys. As
one public defender put it, there is not specific training in our office
... because I think a lot of negotiation is learned just in district
[court because] youre handling so many more cases.... And by the
time you get to you know doing superior court cases, you kind of got
that part of [it] down.60
The survey also asked if attorneys received any written training
materials that related specifically to negotiation skills or plea bar-
gaining. Just under half of the attorneys (44%) responded yes, and
there were no meaningful differences between state-run or local-run
offices, or between large and small offices. Of the 44% who received
these materials, about half (49%) reported that they never consulted
those materials at any point after the time of the training.
As a supplement to these survey results and interviews, we re-
viewed training program agendas from seven of the jurisdictions we
surveyed.61 We requested copies of the training agendas from all of
the offices; only one office sent a complete set of documents, while
others provided several agendas that were readily accessible, and
still others did not respond to our request for documents. We
59. The responses from a few attorneys appear to be unreliable. One attorney replied that
he or she spent 100 hours each year in training on negotiation skills; one attorney each re-
sponded to this question with an answer of 70, 60, 50, 40, and 30 hours. We doubt the
accuracy of these six responses, which leads us to emphasize median rather than mean re-
sponses.
60. Interview with Public Defender F [hereinafter Interview with F]; see also Interview
with Public Defender G [hereinafter Interview with G] (I dont think that weve had in office
training on negotiations or the plea bargaining process. Not that I can recall.).
61. The training agendas came from California, Florida, Iowa, New York, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Washington. We also reviewed agendas from two training sessions for a national
audience.
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supplemented these responses with online searches for training ma-
terials from the last three years that were posted and available to
the public. In all, we collected the agendas for fifty-one distinct
training events.
With those documents in hand, we analyzed their content. Based
on the title of each topic during the training event and any sum-
mary of the material to be covered during that time slot, we esti-
mated the percentage of the total event that was devoted to
negotiation topics, guilty pleas, or trial topics.62 Many of these pub-
lished training agendas indicated that no formal training relating
to plea negotiations took place in the program; about half of the
agendas addressed no topics that directly related to negotiation. A
few more agendas listed topics related to guilty pleas, with indirect
connections to negotiation (such as a generic reference to plea bar-
gaining) but even these topics do not receive sustained attention in
the training session. One typical program of eight weeks of training
for a major metropolitan public defender office offered a pronounced
focus on trial skills but only two short sessions on pleas and sen-
tences.
The important feature of these training agendas is the compari-
son between negotiation topics and trial topics. These programs
devoted an average of 12% of time or pages to negotiation topics,
whereas they devoted 44% to trial and evidence topics.
We do not believe that the published training agendas available
to us reflect the full range of training opportunities available to
public defenders in these jurisdictions. There are bound to be some
shorter, informal training sessions (perhaps scheduled for the lunch
hour in a single office) that were not documented with a written
agenda. And some training agendas were not available to us. Never-
theless, we have no reason to believe that the agendas we analyzed
were unusual in the topics they addressed. The agendas we gather-
ed from a number of jurisdictions appear to show even less negotia-
tion training than reported in the surveys.
62. The negotiation category included any topics related explicitly to negotiation skills,
negotiation theory, or bargaining techniques. The guilty plea category covered topics related
to guilty pleas but not explicitly dealing with negotiation theory or practices. The trial
category reached topics related to trial techniques and evidence to be used at trial. Some
training topics did not fall into any of these categories.
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The surveys, interviews, and content analysis of the available
training agendas all confirm that current formal training programs
do not often address negotiation skills or strategies. The emphasis
instead is on performance at trial and the preparation necessary to
be ready for effective representation at trial. Any opportunities for
reflection and learning about negotiation topics, therefore, are likely
to happen informally, in the untracked and random interactions
between attorneys in the office.63
3. Routine Preparation
Just as negotiation skills remain at the periphery of formal train-
ing for new attorneys and for veteran public defenders, intentional
preparation for negotiation remains the exception for public defend-
ers during their routine practice of law. Defense attorneys might
give some thought to negotiation before they interact with prosecu-
tors in a case.64 They do not, however, devote the same level of prep-
aration to negotiation that they give to trial preparation in their
cases.
According to responses from one question in our survey, 38% of
the attorneys discuss or moot their upcoming negotiations with a
colleague or supervisor often or always.65 However, this discus-
sion normally happens in informal settings with colleagues.66 When
asked how often they prepare for negotiation through a pre-negotia-
tion meeting with a supervisor (a practice that often applies to trial
63. See Interview with Public Defender H [hereinafter Interview with H] ([W]hen you
mentioned the question before about mooting, we dont have anything formal where somebody
is going to come in and were going to sit down and this is how you should negotiate this. We
will sometimes have somebody sit down and say, so I have this case and ... Im looking to try
to get that, what might be things I could tell the prosecutor that might help persuade
them?); Interview with Public Defender I ([C]ertainly its subject matter that comes up
when ... youre saying, should I take up this offer or not and everybody is peppering you with
a million questions.).
64. The potential content of this negotiation-specific preparation is discussed in more
detail below. See infra Part III.B.
65. The frequency score for this question was 3.2, with no meaningful differences among
types of offices or attorneys with different types of caseloads.
66. See Interview with B, supra note 54 ([W]e have an informal team meeting in the office
where we meet once a week, and we talk about cases, and we talk aboutit could be issues
for trials, but it could also be about negotiations and what should I be looking out in this case
for this client.).
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preparation), only 4% of the respondents said that they follow this
practice often or always.67
Most of the attorney preparation for negotiation instead appear
to be solitary activities. These activities are indistinguishable from
the activities of an attorney who is preparing for a trial. Table 1
summarizes the average frequency score we assigned to the relevant
answers, with 1 meaning never, 2 meaning infrequently, 3 mean-
ing sometimes, 4 meaning often, and 5 meaning always.
Table 1. Frequency of Preparation Activities in Anticipation of
Negotiation
Preparation Activity Average Frequency
Asking how client feels about potential outcomes 4.7
Exploring collateral consequences 4.0
Conducting legal research 3.8
Interviewing defense witnesses 3.6
Interviewing prosecution witnesses 3.1
Investigation of crime scene 2.8
The lack of attention specifically devoted to training about
negotiation skills and techniques finds a parallel in office practice.
Attorneys do less preparation with their peers and supervisors prior
to a negotiation than they do prior to a trial. Their individual prep-
arations for negotiation overlap entirely with trial preparations.
When it comes to negotiations, public defenders prepare and per-
form their work using the same framework as they do for the trial;
they do not devote separate thought or preparation to the very dif-
ferent context of a negotiation.
4. Why the Reluctance to Train?
Why would the offices provide so little formal training related to
negotiation techniques? The survey itself does not pursue this ques-
tion, but our hour-long interviews on the subject did offer some
insight.
67. The frequency score for this question was 1.9; there were no meaningful differences
among types of offices or attorneys with different types of caseloads.
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The attorneys who talked with us explained the lack of formal
training about negotiation by pointing to the nature of the know-
ledge an attorney must hold to succeed at negotiation. In their view,
that knowledge is too complex and too dependent on individual per-
sonalities and specific relationships among the negotiators to be
amenable to systematic study or theoretical insight. The lack of
training, therefore, does not reflect the idea that effective negotia-
tion is unimportant to the work of a defense attorney. Rather,
negotiation does not receive direct attention in the training regime
because it is viewed as an art rather than a science.68
We heard in most interviews thatin the words of one public
defendernegotiation is such a nebulous thing.69 Put another way,
it is hard to do any deliberate and systematic preparation for or
training about negotiation. That same public defender elaborated on
the point:
[P]lea-bargaining is ... more an art than a science. I dont know
that there will ever be a set of instructions for how to do it and
I dont think there should be.... [Y]ou kind of learn your way
around in the little cases and you get the gist of it or you dont....
[Y]ou couldnt just sit down with somebodyat a CLE. Heres
how we do this, you got thisits one of these stages where you
got to feel your way through .... I just dont think its something
that can be taught, I mean, heresand its one of the things you
really got to do, its like trying to tell somebody how toI dont
know, fly a jet or something.70
The analogy to flying a jet is interesting. The speaker argues that
complex tasks like flying a jet cannot be taught; they have to be
learned by just jumping in and doing it. Yet, in the authors experi-
ences, in the setting of a law school classroom, students almost al-
ways stumble when they moot a negotiation exercise; their learning
curve is steeper here than for simulated cross-examinations of a
police officer or closing arguments to a jury. And they do get better
68. Interview with Public Defender J [hereinafter Interview with J].
69. Id.; see also Interview with Public Defender K ([I]ts not like in law school, you dont
know whats reasonable until you practice a little bit.).
70. Interview with J, supra note 68. The same attorney offered another description for the
intuitive nature of plea negotiation skill: I mean this isnt rocket science but its more of the
art form of rocket science. Some people just dont get it. Id.
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at the task after practice and reflection on what they can learn from
that practice.
Another common theme among public defenders was that nego-
tiation cannot be taught because it depends so much on individual
personality or the unique interaction between the individual defense
attorney and prosecutor.71 The skill is highly individualized, de-
fenders argue, making it pointless to generalize about the topic or
to transfer the skill from one attorney to another.72 As one attorney
explained:
[N]egotiation I guess is more about style .... But no I cant say we
have had any real formal training on tips and tricks in negotiat-
ing plea bargaining.... [M]ost of the training, the vast majority
of CLEs we do are substantive about, you know, suppression is-
sues, we can talk sentencing structure, sentencing schemes ....
But the nuances of plea-bargaining not so much. Its kind of an
art form.73
Similarly, some defenders argued that prosecutor office policies
differ so radically from one another that defense attorneys in one
district could not offer much guidance on negotiation to defenders
in other jurisdictions. One attorney put it this way: [I]t would be
tough for someone within our organization to put on something
thats really useful to everyone ... to even like a broad sort of swath
among offices. Because the practice of the [prosecutors] offices in
71. Some attorneys argue on this basis that defense attorney training for negotiation is
pointless in some jurisdictions where the prosecutors office policy prohibits any meaningful
bargain. See Interview with Public Defender L ([P]art of the problem is youve got people
from all over the state [at the training]. And I do know in some parts [of] the state that there
were district attorneys who would not give anybody, any sort of plea offer in child sex offense
cases particularly when they were up for re-election.).
72. Interview with D, supra note 56 ([W]hen it comes down to negotiation and plea, [it]
really is about the individuals. Its about individuals: your client, the attorney, and the prose-
cutor.).
73. Interview with Public Defender M [hereinafter Interview with M]; see also Interview
with F, supra note 60 ([I]t just depends ... on your personality type because just the way I
operateyou know its ... like nice guy, Hey lets do this. And ... Ive seen that work for some
people .... [Others] would call for trial, every case is a trial, ... and I think that would probably
work for some people. Like, [O]h this guy I was going to call for trial, let me offer him
something hed take. So its kind of a [sic] hard to teach those different styles because you
dontits hard to teach that because ... thats what the ... specific personality type is.).
2016] TRAINING FOR BARGAINING 1469
terms of plea bargaining ... is just entirely different ... office to
office.74
The same observations about individual style and treating ne-
gotiation as a nuanced art form might apply equally to effective
cross-examination of a witness or to opening statements at trial. Yet
educators and scholars treat these trial preparation and trial per-
formance skills as proper subjects for systematic study and theory-
based instruction.
A few of our interviewees treated negotiation itself as a frivolous
topic, providing less value than the attorney might gain from under-
standing the sentencing options available to the judge. As one attor-
ney put it:
[I]t feels like a used car sale[ ] ... theyre offering [a] high num-
ber, you are offering a low number and then meet in the middle.
But a lot of that is ... knowing what else you can plea to [and]
convince the DA ... thats a proper thing to do. And then knowing
the kind of programs that you can get a person into that kind of
build[s] your credibility that this person is not going to do the
same thing again.75
5. Change on the Horizon
Although training on the topic of negotiation technique is not
commonplace for public defenders,76 there are some signs of change.
Some of our interviewees showed an awareness of negotiation as a
topic for potential training, one that has begun to catch the atten-
tion of office supervisors. One interviewee, after saying that zero
training on negotiation was available to her as a new attorney, said,
[t]hat has changed recently.77 An attorney interviewed in another
state reported that an effort of late to include plea-negotiations as
part of the training ... [is] an important component ... just like you
would have forhow to do a cross-examination.78
Which topics would appear in plea negotiation training? So far,
the answer remains fuzzy for attorneys, even for those who believe
74. Interview with Public Defender N.
75. Interview with F, supra note 60.
76. See supra Sections II.B.1-2.
77. Interview with B, supra note 54.
78. Interview with H, supra note 63.
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the topic is worthwhile to address in training. One interviewee de-
scribed a training program that approached the topic through the
lens of sentencing law: There is a negotiation specific training at
the state level right now, when we conducted most of the training
here, we had a specific training called pleas and sentencing which
kind of discussed the negotiation process and the sentencing process
as part of one presentation.79 Training materials from some of the
jurisdictions in which we conducted interviews did list new attorney
trainings on collateral consequences, along with training on the use
of immigration, employment, and housing consequences as part of
the bargaining and counseling process.
One office supervisor declared negotiation techniques to be a
new area of emphasis for training and speculated about the poten-
tial topics for these sessions. He said that negotiation training in his
office would not only include the basics as embodied in the Sixth
Amendment and the law of legal ethics. It would also include nuan-
ced questions: 
Most of the training that has occurred on plea-bargaining is,
yeah, you give them basics. You give the real basics, how do you
do a plea, how you do a regular plea, what are the Boykin rights,
whats the waiver plea, when is it appropriate, what are the sen-
tencing schemes, blah, blah, blah. But also the ethics involved
and especially after the recent case that came down ... and
obviously youre going to take every plea to your client. But ...
its a lot more nuanced than that. You know ... when do you arm
twist, when you dont arm twist, when is one arm twist too
much, when is one not enough. ... These are the things that you
try to discuss with the attorneys about plea-bargaining.80
In an especially promising trend, several national organizations
that promote the professional development of public defenders
such as Gideons Promise and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyersnow include units on negotiation strategies and
skills in their model training programs.81
79. See Interview with A, supra note 52.
80. Interview with M, supra note 73.
81. The Gideons Promise program includes two-and-a-half to three hours of negotiation
training, which includes simulations, resource lists, and articles on negotiation theory. See
E-mail from Sean M. Maher, Faculty, Gideons Promise, to author (July 8, 2015, 3:44 PM) (on
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In the next Part of this Article, we move beyond these preliminary
suggestions for content. Based on survey responses about current
negotiation practices and insights that are well established in the
study of negotiation outside theplea-bargaining context, we describe
some components of a comprehensive training program in negotia-
tion skills and strategies. In particular, we focus on training that
goes beyond the client counseling phase of the plea bargaining pro-
cess. That phase has received significant and deserved attention in
the wake of several Supreme Court cases considering attorney fail-
ures to counsel clients effectively about plea offers.82 But training
about basic negotiation skills during bargaining between lawyers is
not the same as training about client counseling relating to plea
offers.83
III. TRAINING DEFENDERS TO NEGOTIATE FOR BETTER OUTCOMES
There is no empirical study of whether negotiation training for
defense attorneys would lead to better outcomes for defendants in
the plea bargaining processin part because so little training actu-
ally happens.84 However, studies about the effectiveness of using
particular elements from negotiation theory more generally support
the claim that training matters.85 There is good reason to believe
file with authors). Similarly, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers included
negotiation lectures and sessions at all three of the training programs it held for indigent
defense providers in 2015 through a grant it received from the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
See NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, CLIENTS, NOT CASES: SKILLS FOR OUTSTANDING
REPRESENTATIONAUSTIN, TEXAS AGENDA (2015); NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
CLIENTS, NOT CASES:SKILLS FOR OUTSTANDING REPRESENTATIONDELAWAREAGENDA (2015);
NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, CLIENTS, NOT CASES: SKILLS FOR OUTSTANDING
REPRESENTATIONWASHINGTON AGENDA (2015).
82. See infra Part III.D.2.
83. See Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence Beyond Lafler
and Frye, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) (on file with authors) (Plea
bargaining is the negotiation of a criminal case and therefore includes the three basic phases
in any lawyer-assisted negotiation: the preparation phase, the negotiation phase, and the
client counseling phase.).
84. See Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 90 (2007) (noting
the significant task of definitively measuring his theory about grassroots plea bargaining,
and stating that it may be that the wide range of distinct influences on real-world bargaining
is unknowable and the strength of any isolated identified influence unquantifiable (quoting
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 171 (2005))).
85. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 21; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Dis-
puting Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM.
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that training would improve plea bargaining outcomes86 because
most professional decisions involve a mix of technical components
that are amenable to training and intuitive components that are
not.87 Further, given the realities of the criminal justice system, [i]t
seemingly would follow ... that criminal defense lawyers interested
in obtaining the best results possible for their clients would con-
centrate on becoming effective negotiators.88 Although a full
description of a comprehensive training program for plea negotia-
tions is beyond the scope of this Article, this Part briefly describes
several major areas in which negotiation theory can and should
inform attorney training in plea bargaining.
Local culture, state sentencing law and policy, office policies, and
other factors will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and will
influence how to negotiate most effectively and thus how to train
defenders in plea bargaining.89 Similarly, systemic issues unique to
criminal casessuch as defendants who are often incarcerated,
defense counsel with high workloads, and prosecutors who over-
charge many casesmust be taken into account.90 But this does not
L. REV. 509 (1994); Schneider, supra note 21 (citing various game theory and other studies
testing particular elements from negotiation theory).
86. See Doyel, supra note 23, at 1021 ([R]espondents were asked to evaluate the impor-
tance for effective pretrial criminal representation of various abilities, areas of knowledge, and
character traits.); id. at 1024 (analyzing survey responses and concluding that it appears
that defense lawyers with good negotiation skills can obtain favorable plea bargains even if
they do not get along well with their opponents); Lieberman, supra note 47, at 574 ([T]he
survey indicates that defense attorneys who interview victims have a better chance of
obtaining charge reduction as part of the plea agreement than defense lawyers who do not
interview victims.); cf. Gary T. Lowenthal, Theoretical Notes on Lawyer Competency and an
Overview of the Phoenix Criminal Lawyer Study, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 451, 462 (Although the
development of necessary skills should be a goal of any program to train professionals,
prolonged experience will improve most skills as much or more than concentrated instruction.
On the other hand, without law school instruction covering theoretical matters such as
negotiation process, principles of rhetoric, and the dynamics of a lawyer-client relationship,
attorneys may never master such concepts.).
87. See KENNETH R. HAMMOND, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: IRREDUCIBLE
UNCERTAINTY, INEVITABLE ERROR, UNAVOIDABLE INJUSTICE 147-50 (1996); Sidney A. Shapiro
et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 486-91 (2012).
88. Uphoff, supra note 38, at 74.
89. Cf. OHear & Schneider, supra note 34, at 2 ([P]lea bargaining is undoubtedly a
unique form of dispute resolution, and any attempt to apply the generic lessons of negotiation
theory to criminal law must be undertaken with great care.).
90. See Alkon, supra note 9, at 576-88; Bibas, supra note 10, at 2476-86; Uphoff, supra
note 38, at 77-95.
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mean that training for effective plea bargaining is not possible; it
simply means that training should be locally-calibrated and sen-
sitive to the norms, personalities, and systemic pressures involved.
Different defender offices train in different ways about things like
jury selection, opening statements, and cross-examination; there is
no one-size-fits-all approach, particularly against a backdrop of a
local jury as a potential factfinder. At the same time, there are cer-
tainly many common elements to all training in trial practice areas,
such as the rule that a trial lawyer should never ask a witness on
the stand a question without knowing the answer. Negotiation
training should operate in a similar way.
Just as there are general rules for training about trial practice or
witness interviewing, negotiation literature agrees on the basic
tenets. At a gathering of scholars and practitioners a decade ago,
intended to develop a canon of negotiation theory that cuts across
disciplines, there was broad agreement on six core topics that were
already taught in, and included in the leading textbooks for, all of
those disciplines:
(1) the idea of personal style or strategy or personality in a nego-
tiation (including the concepts of competitive or adversarial v.
interest based or principled or problem-solving);91
(2) the use of communication skillsboth listening and talk-
ingin negotiation;92
(3) the concept of integrative v. distributive negotiations;93
(4) the concept of a bargaining zone between the parties as
well as the concepts of BATNA and reservation prices;94
(5) the use of brainstorming and option creation in a negotiation;
and
(6) the importance of preparation to negotiation.95
91. For a discussion of different negotiation styles and strategies, see infra Part III.A.
92. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
93. For definitions of integrative and distributive bargaining, see supra note 6.
94. For a discussion of BATNA, see infra Part III.B.
95. Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Catching Up with the Major-
General: The Need for a Canon of Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 637, 643-44 (2004); see also
Howard Gadlin et al., Of Babies and Bathwater: Innovation and Continuity in Negotiation
Pedagogy, in EDUCATING NEGOTIATORS FOR A CONNECTED WORLD 47, 53 (Christopher Honey-
man et al. eds., 2013) (repeating the six core concepts in the canon, but cautioning that this
is only a sharply limited list of items then taught [in 2004] across all negotiation classes).
While this list does not explicitly include the substantive rights at stake, see Condlin, supra
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The survey data reported in Part II suggests that the failure to train
defense attorneys about even these basic concepts can cause real
problems.
We direct our proposals for negotiation training in this Part to
defense attorneys, without addressing the prospect of training for
prosecutors. Is the benefit of training for defendants therefore
temporary, a competitive advantage that disappears as soon as
prosecutors also learn more about negotiation theory and strategy?
There is no rigorous empirical investigation of this question in the
criminal context. We imagine, however, that at least some training
benefits for the defense would survive even after both parties up-
grade their negotiation skills. As we explain below, some negotiation
environments lend themselves to a cooperative strategy or style that
can benefit both parties. Even in more competitive zero-sum con-
texts, one party might use training better than the other. When it
comes to trial techniques, we do not give up on training defense
attorneys for better cross-examinations just because prosecutors
might receive the same training. The same line of thought applies
to negotiation training for defense attorneys.
A. Training About Negotiation Strategies and Styles
One early article calling for legal scholars to study negotiation
noted how, [i]n all negotiations, regardless of the context, certain
strategic decisions must be made by each party, and stated that
such decisions can and should be planned systematically, according
to general principles applicable to all negotiations.96 Negotiation
theory offers various names for different strategies and styles, but
as a general matter, the current legal negotiation literature distin-
guishes between a cooperative/problem-solving/integrative approach
note 5, at 296 (It is as if proponents of [New Legal Bargaining Theory] think it does not
matter who has the stronger case in a legal dispute and that all that counts is who is the most
psychologically adept and sociable bargainer.), the legal merits of the case are central to any
determination of (4) and (5), and represent a core research and analysis task in (6). Cf.
Bowers, supra note 84, at 86 (noting, in the misdemeanor context, how [p]olice, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and defendants pay little attention to what the law is; they pay attention,
instead, to past practices that serve as precedents for parties future expectations and
performances) (footnote omitted).
96. Lowenthal, supra note 27, at 69.
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and a competitive/adversarial/distributive approach.97 The former
refers to a situation in which the parties can add value to the negot-
iation in a mutually beneficial manner,98 whereas the latter
describes a zero-sum situation in which one negotiators concession
is a loss that leads to the other sides gain.99
Plea bargaining might seem to be a purely distributive situation
calling for a highly competitive approach because it appears that
one negotiators concession is a loss that leads to the other sides
gain.100 In fact, the repeat-player nature of the relationships in crim-
inal law practiceworking together in one courthouse, over and
overmay move some aspects of the negotiation away from compet-
itive to a necessarily more cooperative strategy.101 Indeed, as Andrea
Kupfer Schneiders important negotiation work demonstrates, it is
clear that extremely high levels of problem-solving behavior are
exhibited between the prosecutor and the defendants attorney.102
97. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 38-40 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 3d ed. 2011); WILLIAMS, supra
note 21, at 53-54 (1983) (describing cooperative strategy); Gifford, supra note 33, at 43 (outlin-
ing three distinct negotiating strategies: competitive, cooperative, and integrative); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 6, at 816 n.243 (describing four negotiation strategies: 1) conventional
adversarial; 2) problem solving (meeting needs); 3) fair or objective negotiation (solutions
mediated by outside standards where needs are not the only criteria); and 4) conventional
cooperative (compromise)).
98. See FISHER & URY, supra note 97, at 72-75.
99. See Lowenthal, supra note 27, at 73 (When the individual interests of two negotiating
parties directly conflict with one another, and each seeks to enhance its own interests, the two
parties normally adopt competitive strategies to win the negotiation.); cf. Gifford, supra note
33, at 43 (Although leading negotiation theorists share a common understanding of what
constitutes the competitive strategy, there is little consistency in the descriptions and names
of noncompetitive theories. Noncompetitive strategies are variously referred to as collabor-
ative, cooperative, and problem-solving.) (footnotes omitted).
100. One commentator warned that even the most committed cooperative negotiators must
be prepared for junctures in a particular negotiation that call for a competitive approach, as
well as counterparts who will work in only an adversarial, zero-sum approach. See Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Empowering Students to Create and Claim Value Through the Thomas-
Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument, 28 NEGOT. J. 79, 80 (2012). In short, [u]nderstanding
distributional bargaining is, therefore, important as a defensive strategy. Id.
101. See ARTHURROSETT& DONALD R.CRESSY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEABARGAINS IN THE
AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 108 (1976) (stating that the workday of the courthouse would be so
crammed with bluffs, counter bluffs, and counter-counter bluffs, that there would be no time
for dispositions if plea bargaining followed a competitive strategy model); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 6, at 785-87 (questioning the wisdom of defining any particular context, including
criminal cases, as zero-sum).
102. Schneider, supra note 46, at 156-57 (In criminal law, the geographic area of practice
is narrow and the population of prosecutors and criminal lawyers is also limited. Criminal
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Further, results from [Schneiders study] suggest that criminal law
may be an unexpectedly fertile environment to maximize positive
problem-solving methods.103 Another legal negotiation scholar, ap-
plying specific factors to choose a negotiation strategy for a particu-
lar context, concluded that criminal defense attorneys should adopt
a predominantly cooperative strategy coupled with some early
competitive tactics and integrative solutions whenever feasible.104
Consider the following example of the potential to create win-win
situations in plea bargaining. A nineteen-year-old defendant is char-
ged with misdemeanor assault in an incident resulting in some
injury to the victim. An assault conviction will mean the defendant
will lose his job, but the charge of disorderly conduct (a different
misdemeanor in the jurisdiction, carrying a lower potential sentence
than assault) will not result in that outcome. The jurisdiction also
has a mechanism for deferred judgment in which, after a guilty plea,
entry of judgment is stayed while the defendant serves a period of
probation; successful completion results in discharge without a
judgment of conviction. Defense counsel interviews the victim and
takes a statement from him that describes how payment of medical
bills is a primary concern and how the victim is upset the defendant
has neither offered to pay nor contacted the victim (an acquain-
tance) to apologize. The prosecution has an office policy requiring a
memo to a supervisor when there is a plea offer made on an assault
case. Defense counsel offers to share the victims statement with the
prosecutor so the statement (once confirmed by the prosecutor) can
form the basis for the memo to the supervisor (thus saving the
prosecutor time and effort). Counsel also shares a letter from the
defendants boss about how an assault conviction will result in job
lossand thus inability to pay the medical billsand describes how
the deferred judgment will allow the young defendant to continue
to develop in the workplace and pay off the bills over time.
lawyers deal with each other repeatedly.).
103. Id. at 152; see also id. at 156 (No other group of lawyers appears to be so problem-
solving. And this rating comes from the prosecutors with whom they are negotiating.) (em-
phasis omitted). But see Alkon, supra note 9, at 608 (Plea bargaining is all too often not much
of a negotiation, but rather a take-it-or-leave-it conversation where the prosecutor holds all
the cards, and the defendant can either decide to cut his losses, or compound them.).
104. Gifford, supra note 33, at 79.
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These opportunities for cooperative strategies, which may come
as a surprise to some criminal law practitioners, deserve some place
in a training focused on effective negotiation. One reason for the
surprisingly noncompetitive dynamic in criminal case negotiations
could be that clients are not in a positionas a matter of education,
physical liberty, or accessibilityto push their state-funded lawyers
to be more aggressive.105 At the very least, defenders could learn to
interview clients to get information they need to determine the most
effective negotiation approach and to counsel clients in a manner
that allows them to make a truly informed and uncoerced decision
about whether to plead guilty.
Negotiation style and strategy often go hand in hand simply be-
cause, to take one example, someone with a competitive style will
feel comfortable with competitive strategy. But separating personal
style from negotiation strategies yields new flexibility for the
negotiator.... Further, a negotiator should often make competitive,
cooperative, and integrative moves within a single negotiation.106
Consider a situation in which defense counsel has decided to adopt
a competitive strategy but a cooperative style with respect to a
certain aspect of the casefor example, the client is not incarcer-
ated and will not plead guilty to anything involving jail or prison
time. Counsel must then find a nice way to withhold informa-
tionsuch as an upcoming trial in another of the attorneys
casesthat would not undercut the planned cooperative style.
To be sure, negotiation theory is not easy or intuitive stuff.
Indeed, the nuances that distinguish approach (strategy) from style
are often lost on students.107 Schneider notes how her teaching
105. See Schneider, supra note 46, at 160; see also Bibas, supra note 10, at 2511-12 ([De-
fendants] risk preferences vary with demographics, including sex; adolescence and age
generally; wealth, social class, self-employment, and education; church attendance; and mar-
ital status.) (footnotes omitted).
106. Gifford, supra note 33, at 48 (footnote omitted); see id. at 82 ([N]egotiation theory
suggests that the plea bargaining strategy most likely to succeed in a typical case is one which
begins with a competitive approach and progresses to a cooperative approach as negotiations
continue. To accomplish this strategy switch, the defense attorney should attempt to maintain
a cordial and accommodative relationship with the prosecutor, even during the early phases
of bargaining.); see also Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Negotiation
Barometry: A Dynamic Measure of Conflict Management Style, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
557, 557 (2013) (Many negotiators find that they shiftthey change their styles in one way
or anotherto adjust to the rising temperature of the conflict.).
107. Schneider, supra note 5, at 20.
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focus is almost completely on skills that support the styles rather
than on debating effective styles, because [a]dult professionals
learn better by talking first about experiences and skills, and then
focusing on framework or style selection.108 Thus, she teaches a
triangle of skills109assertiveness (speaking), empathy (listening
and inquiry), and flexibility (inventing and adapting)on the theory
that having effective skills allows negotiators to make informed and
contextualized stylistic choices.110 In the context of client interview-
ing, active listening and open-ended questioning are well-accepted
and commonly taught techniques, drawn from social science under-
standings of such things as memory and observation.111 Similarly,
negotiation training could include such information-gathering
techniques. For example, active listening might elicit important in-
formation from opposing counsel during the bargaining session.112
Understanding how to implement a particular style or strategy is
an undervalued skill in plea bargaining. Many defenders view them-
selves as simply begging or as needing to threaten to take every-
thing to trial to get anything good out of a negotiation.113 Yet just as
training can teach attorneys how to cross-examine or interview
without antagonizing the witnessor to decide when one might
want to antagonize the witnesstraining can be aimed at exploring
different styles and strategies of negotiation. One negotiation
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id. at 26.
110. See id. at 26-27.
111. See, e.g., STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS
92, 97-100 (5th ed. 2015).
112. See G.NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 59, 95-96 (3d ed. 2012) (including, among
the most useful techniques for obtaining information from your opponent ... (1) asking broad,
open-ended questions when seeking maximum information; (2) using silence, encouragement,
and questions that call for elaboration; [and] (3) listening intently and patiently).
113. See Interview with G, supra note 60 ([A]t the end of the day, if you come back with
a counter offer and theyre aware that youre willing to go to trial twice or you know, multiple
times. Then, I notice that we get a lot better offers from them.); Interview with H, supra note
63 ([M]ost defense attorneys in most cases, feel as though they are [at] the disadvantage that
they have less to leverage, they have less to work with.); Interview with J, supra note 68
([T]he prime directive ... for this office and I would hope every public defender office I think
[is that] its malpractice to plead guilty to any charge without any incentive, I dont care how
guilty the person is.); see also Uphoff, supra note 38, at 95 n.80 (Although the image of the
advocate going hat in hand to beg for mercy for ones client may be far-removed from the
romanticized view of the criminal defense lawyer depicted in the movies, on television and in
print, it is all too familiar to those who have represented many criminal defendants.).
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scholar (who also conducts trainings) described how lawyers may
spend hours gathering the factual, legal, economic, and political
information for a negotiation, but spend only 10-15 minutes pre-
paring a negotiation strategy.114 This strategy usually focuses only
on [w]here they plan to begin; [w]here they hope to end up; and
[t]heir bottom lines. In between the starting point and the conclu-
sion of their interactions, they wing it, thinking of their encounters
as wholly unstructured.115 In short, a little training about particu-
lar negotiation strategies and styles, as well as the skills to
implement them, could go a long way.
B. Training About Preparation: Understanding BATNA
The whole purpose of a negotiation is to get a more desirable
outcome than you would get without the negotiation.116 To deter-
mine whether a deal is worth taking, a negotiator must figure out
what would happen if the parties do not reach agreement.117 The
Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is a concept
that gives a negotiator a reference point for knowing when to walk
away from the negotiating table.118
At first impression, it seems that the BATNA for a plea agree-
ment in a criminal case will either be a trial, a dispositive eviden-
tiary hearing (especially in drug or weapon possession cases), or an
open guilty plea to all charges.119 Those are certainly likely alterna-
tives should negotiations fail, and thus defense counsel must de-
termine the BATNA by carefully calculating: (1) the likelihood of
114. Craver, supra note 11, at 61-62. Based on our research, both of these estimates seem
quite overoptimistic.
115. Id. at 62.
116. See FISHER & URY, supra note 97, at 102.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 102-06 (defining BATNA). For a contemporary (and fun) take on BATNAs,
see Jennifer W. Reynolds, Breaking BATNAs: Negotiation Lessons from Walter White, 45 N.M.
L. REV. 611, 622-26 (2015) (using Breaking Bad character Walter Whites negotiation for his
own life to illustrate his and his potential assassins BATNAs). Negotiation theory also refers
to the reservation point, meaning the bottom line or least favorable point at which one
would settle. See Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, supra note 6, at 1791-94
(arguing that figuring out the best alternatives to agreement helps determine the reservation
point).
119. See Alkon, supra note 9, at 606.
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acquittal on each count in the charging document,120 and (2) the
likely sentence the particular judge would impose after (a) a plea to
all charges or (b) a conviction after trial.121
While many defense attorneys may feel confident in their ability
to determine quickly and intuitively the likelihood of success at
trial,122 training to take a step back and more methodically deter-
mine a BATNA is likely to improve bargaining outcomes. Fisher and
Ury, who coined the term, recommend a three-step process for de-
termining a BATNA: brainstorming a list of actions to be taken if
there is no agreement, converting the most promising ideas into
tangible alternatives, and selecting the best alternative.123
To give one example, consider a drug sale case in which the police
officer will testify that he observed the defendant hand a small
packet to another person in exchange for money. The police found
cocaine on that person; they also found cash and several small
baggies of cocaine on the defendant. Obvious potential actions if
there is no plea agreement are to win at trial or to get the defendant
a pre- or post-plea diversionary deal (success in drug treatment in
exchange for eventual dismissal of the charges). Too many defend-
ers will do a quick calculation of the likelihood of winning the trial
or getting into the program and will then enter the actual negotia-
tion.
However, more emphasis on Fisher and Urys second step
making promising alternatives more tangiblecould significantly
improve the defendants negotiation position. For example, even if
the prosecution is unlikely to offer diversion, helping the client en-
ter drug treatment may convince a judge to keep the defendant in
that program even after a trial conviction or nonnegotiated guilty
120. As part of (1), defense counsel would predict the likelihood of suppression, given the
particular judge (if known).
121. This calculation applies if the parties know the sentencing judge at the time of nego-
tiation. If they do not, it is more complexbut certainly not impossibleto determine the
BATNA.
122. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 133, 140-41, 142 fig.2 (2010).
123. FISHER & URY, supra note 97, at 105-06. But see Alkon, supra note 9, at 606 ([For] the
typical criminal defendant who has no real defense and no leverage except for the threat of
forcing the case to trial.... the list of actions is usually limited to two: take the deal or go to
trial.); id. at 605 (For most criminal defense lawyers, the concept of a BATNA, although a
standard part of negotiation theory, is often not a helpful aid in their analysis of the case and
the issues confronting the typical client during plea bargaining.).
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plea. Even if acquittal seems unlikely, a visit to the scene and an
interview of the alleged buyer124 might uncover facts that increase
the likelihood of acquittal on the top count. These efforts might
reveal poor lighting at the corner of the alleged transaction, or that
the buyer had drugs in a red baggie while those on the defendant
were in clear baggies. Though these steps are fairly typical for coun-
sel to take as a case approaches trial, they are not always consid-
ered part of the preparation process for negotiation. Training about
BATNAs would emphasize the importance of early investigation
and planning to the negotiation process.125 Using the BATNA
method would lead to a different calculation of the best alternative
to agreement, and thus a stronger position from which to negotiate,
as well as a better sense of when to walk away from the negotiation.
One of the few empirical studies of defense counsels actual
preparation for plea negotiation stated that [d]efense attorneys
who interviewed prosecution witnesses and conducted extensive fact
investigations would, ... in a great majority of cases, improve the
bargaining position of their clients involved in plea negotiations.126
This conclusion was based in part on surveying criminal defense
attorneys about their most recent felony cases that went to trial,
and learning that in three-fourths of those recent cases, respondents
perceived the prosecutions evidence at trial to be weaker than the
evidence in the police reports disclosed during discovery.127 The
conclusion about the likely effect of thorough preparation (in the
form of investigation) before bargaining was also based on survey
responses from about fifty-two felony cases involving violent crime
victims.128 Lawyers reported getting better outcomes in cases in
which they interviewed victims than in cases without an inter-
view.129 In another study, despite rating the skill of negotiation as
124. Alternatively, defense counsel could review the court file if the buyers case is still
ongoing and he and his counsel do not agree to an interview.
125. There are obviously numerous systemic obstacles to such preparation, such as high
workloads for public defenders, see supra note 90 and accompanying text, and lack of available
treatment programs. Still, there are too many instances in which, even without clear
obstacles, counsel fails to do even the most rudimentary investigation before beginning plea
negotiations. See, e.g., Doyel, supra note 23, at 1025-27.
126. Lieberman, supra note 47, at 572.
127. Id. at 572 tbl.5.
128. See id. at 573.
129. See id. at 573, 574 & n.97 (noting, however, that although the statistical significance
of the comparison is questionable, the data is presented because of logical reasons).
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very important to pretrial practice, one half of respondents did not
conduct a thorough investigation, do legal research, or develop a
theory of defense before plea negotiations.130 These studies offer
strong support for the hypothesis that negotiation training can re-
sult in more effective negotiation, meaning better outcomes for
defendants in criminal cases.
Although a defense attorney should not counsel accepting a deal
that leaves the defendant worse off than if he went to trial, calculat-
ing the BATNA in a criminal case is more complicated than cal-
culating the likelihood of conviction and likely sentence if convicted
because failure to reach an agreement can lead to outcomes other
than trial. Failing to agree can lead to an unexpectedly better
bargain later in the process, or even dismissal of the charges.131 This
is particularly true in misdemeanor cases, in which simply waiting
until the trial date approaches can lead to a better outcome.132
Again, though these alternative outcomes to a failed negotiation
may seem obvious, training can, at the very least, remind defenders
about the various possible results in a criminal case and highlight
that not all options surface in an initial negotiation.133
130. Doyel, supra note 23, at 1026. Attorneys also listed creativitymeaning the ability
to fashion sentencing alternativesas important to effective bargaining. Id. at 1028.
131. See M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideons Gold: How Much
Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. 2358, 2368-69 (2013) (In fiscal years 2011 and 2012,
we obtained dismissals on almost a quarter of our felonies, more than a third of our misde-
meanors, and a third of our juvenile cases. In prior years, I had only focused on trials and
pleas, never on the best possible outcome, which is dismissal of charges.) (footnote omitted).
132. See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089,
1099 (2013); Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of Student
Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 867-82 (1996) (describing his
analysis of clinic student representation, which showed that a significant number of clinic
clients who declined to plead guilty at arraignment later got dismissals, deferred dismissals,
or plea offers to reduced charges).
133. See Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement as a Product of Re-
cursive Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & SOCY REV. 335, 342 (1996) (describing ethnographic re-
search showing how court-appointed defense attorneys, among other bargaining strategies,
may receive a reasonable offer but still consider whether [that] offer might get better further
along in the adjudication process).
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C. Training About Communication Strategies and Information
Exchange During the Bargaining Process
Negotiation texts often devote sections to strategies for com-
munication or persuasion during the actual negotiation.134 Studies
confirm the effects of various communication techniques in a nego-
tiation.135 This Section details some of the negotiation skills that
lawyers can learn to use effectively while bargaining, including an-
choring, strategic information exchange, and the use of data to set
objective criteria.
1. Anchoring
Anchoring describes a phenomenon in which the initial value
given to a particular item strongly influences the ultimate valuation
of that item.136 The first offer in a negotiation serves as an anchor
and can thus advantage the negotiator willing to make the initial
move.137 As one negotiation scholar put it, [p]roficient negotiators
generally attempt to develop the most extreme positions they can
rationally defend.138
There are only a few studies on anchoring in criminal cases, but
they demonstrate that anchoring does affect outcomes. For example,
one study found that a prosecutors sentencing demand clearly in-
fluences the defense attorneys [subsequent] demand ... rather than
working against the prosecutors initial demand, defense attorneys
assimilate their own sentencing demand to it.139 Although this
134. See, e.g., KOROBKIN, supra note 35, at ch.3.
135. See, e.g., Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotia-
tion: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 621-22 (2006).
136. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974) (introducing anchoring).
137. Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of Per-
spective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 657, 657 (2001)
([W]e empirically demonstrate for the first time that simply making a first offer in an actual
negotiation affords a distributive advantage because the first offer serves as an anchor.); see
also id. at 657-58 (noting how some types of perspective-taking and some types of self-focus
can overcome the effect of anchoring by the first offer).
138. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 56 (2d ed.
1993).
139. Birte Englich et al., The Last Word in CourtA Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense,
29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 712 (2005); see also id. at 716 (concluding that, in part because
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study did not involve plea negotiations, the authors noted how de-
fense counsel is likely to be exposed, and thus anchored, to the
prosecutions sentencing demands during plea bargaining.140 Former
federal judge Nancy Gertner has described the federal sentencing
guidelines as an anchor for judges,141 and in a recent Second Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, Judges Calabresi and Raggi discussed
(and disagreed about the effect of) anchoring in the case.142
Stephanos Bibas has offered a theoretical account of anchoring
during plea bargaining.143 He described how overcharging, as well
as prosecutors making initial offers with unreasonably high senten-
ces, can lead a defendant to jump at the deal when the prosecutor
then offers something lower but perhaps still unfavorable.144 As
Bibas noted, it is difficult for defenders to push back against their
clients and their own anchoring biases.145 Studies have shown that
being aware of a cognitive bias does not undo its effect, nor does
concentrating on the bias or even offering money to resist the
bias.146 Most relevant to the training hypothesis in this Article:
Negotiators who simply learn on the job do not outgrow their biases
and heuristics. But specific training can teach negotiators to be
attentive to their own biases, to focus on actual gains and losses,
and to resist framing and other manipulations.147
defense attorneys adjust their sentencing demands to the prosecutors initial demand, the
defenses demand actually moves the judge closer to the prosecutors demand).
140. See id. at 712; see also Jeff Greenberg et al., Considering the Harshest Verdict First:
Biasing Effects on Mock Juror Verdicts, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 41, 43-45
(1986) (describing an experiment in which mock jurors in a homicide case were biased towards
harsher verdicts when they were instructed to consider various verdicts in a harsh-to-lenient
order).
141. See Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006) (In effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides
ready-made anchors.); see also Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive Anchoring Effect
and Blind Spot Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Funda-
mental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 524 (2014).
142. Compare United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (arguing that anchoring influences judgments), with id. at 48-50 (Raggi, J.,
concurring) (respectfully disagreeing).
143. See Bibas, supra note 10.
144. See id. at 2518.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 2522.
147. Id. (footnote omitted)
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The concept of anchoringa commonplace tool of negotiation
theorythus suggests the advantages of making an initial offer
and, from the defense perspective, setting that offer low. Even if the
offer is unrealistically low, as long as it is defensible, it works in the
clients favor in terms of the ultimate outcome of the negotiation.
This insight does not apply to every case. As a general matter,
though, a practice of making first offers and low offers would tend
to have negotiation advantages for a defense attorney. Further,
studies show that negotiators who set specific, optimistic goals get
better outcomes than negotiators with vague or less aspirational
goals.148
Responses to our surveys show that public defenders do not often
try a first offer or a low offer. As Table 2 illustrates, when asked to
characterize their own first offers in typical cases, defenders typi-
cally answered that their offers were closer to unfavorable than
favorable for their own clients.
Table 2. Defense First Offer Characterized
Number of
Responses
Very Unfavorable = 1 34
Unfavorable = 2 88
Reasonable = 3 54
Favorable = 4 50
Very Favorable = 5 41
Average Rating 2.9
There were no meaningful differences in the responses to this
question based on the gender or race of the attorney or the type of
caseload they carry. Across all of these groups, the less ambitious
first offers were the most common. Indeed, the average offer from a
defense attorney was less than one level higher than the typical first
offer from the prosecutor (defense attorneys on average scored the
prosecutors first offer at 2.0). The governance structure of the office
148. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Aspirations in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 675, 676-
77 (2004) (discussing studies); see also G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE:
NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 34-36 (2d ed. 2006).
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in which the defenders work did matter in the response to this ques-
tion. Attorneys working in state-operated offices rather than local
offices were more likely to characterize their own offers as more
favorable to their clients (at 2.7 for local offices and 3.1 for state
offices).149
The average rating for defenders characterization of their own
first offers is, surprisingly, just below reasonable for their clients.
Training about anchoring would highlight how making a very fa-
vorable offer (made more reasonable by developing a sound
BATNA) might be the better approach in many cases.
According to another set of our survey questions, defense attor-
neys often allow prosecutors to initiate the bargaining process and
to make the first concrete offer. We assigned a frequency score to
the answers, on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning never, 2 meaning
infrequently, 3 meaning sometimes, 4 meaning usually, and 5
meaning always. The survey respondents estimates about the
most common sequence of events during a negotiation are summa-
rized in Table 3 below.
Table 3. Frequency of Offering Behaviors
Event Average Frequency
Prosecutor initiates bargaining process 3.1
Prosecutor makes first concrete offer 3.9
Prosecutor makes take-it-or-leave-it offer 3.2
Client accepts first offer 2.7
Defense makes counteroffer if prosecutor
offers first 4.1
Misdemeanor attorneys answered the Prosecutor makes first
concrete offer question at an average of 4.3, which is a statistically
significant difference from all other attorneys at 3.9.150 This
149. We hypothesize that state-run offices tend to benefit from more consistent and delib-
erate training regimes, because the leadership in such an organization is always aware of the
training and support needed for attorneys working in small, geographically dispersed offices.
This difference between state and local offices is statistically significant, using a t-test. The
t-value = 2.61 and p = 0.0096.
150. The t-value = 4.927954 and p < 0.00001.
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suggests that misdemeanor prosecutors are significantly more likely
than prosecutors generally to make the first concrete offer.
It is worth noting that the prosecutor makes the first offer more
often on average (3.9) than the prosecutor initiates the bargaining
discussion (3.1). This discrepancy indicates that defense attorneys
wait for a prosecutors offer, even when they themselves initiate the
discussion.151 In some cases, there may be a reason for such an
approach, but in many others, waiting may simply indicate the
defenders belief that the prosecutor holds more power in the ne-
gotiation. Given what we know about anchoring and first offers,
defenders should not wait so often for the prosecution to make an
offer and thus anchor the negotiation.
2. Strategic Information Exchange
Another aspect of communication during the actual negotiation
is strategic information exchangeformulating a specific plan in
advance of the bargaining session for what information to seek out,
what information to share, and what information to withhold. Plea
bargaining discussions offer an excellent opportunity to learn some-
thing about the states evidence, case theory, and views on sentenc-
ing in the particular case.
While bargaining has the added benefit of providing discovery to
defense counsel in the event the case goes to trial, it can also allow
defense counsel to understand the underlying interests of the prose-
cution. This understanding is critical to an integrative bargaining
approach, which requires crafting proposals to take advantage of
differences in interests and preferences between the negotiators.152
Simply asking for such information in a straightforward manner
might work in some instances, but there are more sophisticated
ways to get information. Training can address how to accomplish
this goal, just as training addresses different ways to get informa-
151. In some jurisdictions, the defense attorneys delay might reflect local discovery prac-
tices. When the prosecutor provides discovery at the same moment as the first plea offer, the
defense attorney may have compelling reasons not to make the first offer.
152. KOROBKIN, supra note 35, at 123 (Bargaining should therefore be seen as an oppor-
tunity to develop the knowledge about the opposing negotiator that can make such proposals
possible.).
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tion during a witness interview153 or cross-examination.154 Indeed,
G. Nicholas Hermans treatise, Plea Bargaining, recommends that
practitioners prepare a Plea Bargaining Preparation Outline that
includes lists of Information To Find Out, Information To Reveal,
and Information To Protect.155 Discussing the actual bargaining
session, Herman offers five methods for dodging questions that
seek to elicit information on the To Protect list.156
To offer just one example of the myriad ways in which defense
counsel might prepare for negotiation by carefully planning for
potential information exchange, consider a scenario in which the
only prosecution witness is a police officer. The charges are drug
possession and resisting arrest, and the defendant was released
after arraignment and went immediately to the hospital for medical
treatment relating to nonminor injuries sustained during the arrest.
Planning for and then working to strategically elicit information
about the particular police officer during the negotiation will shed
some light on the governments underlying interests in the case.
Does the prosecutor know or appear to know of any brutality
complaints against this police officer? Does the prosecution or police
officer know that the defendant visited the hospital? On the flip
side, defense counsel must carefully consider what information to
withhold in the bargaining session. What will counsel say if the
prosecutor asks if her client was injured during the arrest? Is this
information that would foreclose a good offer based on the govern-
ments desire to protect against the possibility of a civil lawsuit for
injuries sustained during the arrest, or would it help facilitate such
a plea on the theory that evidence of those injuries at trial would
make a jury trial difficult to win in the particular jurisdiction and
would lead to bad publicity for the police department? These are not
easy decisions, and should not be made in the heat of the negotia-
tion without careful advance preparation.
153. See KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 111, at ch. 9.
154. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES AND TRIALS ch.6 (9th ed. 2013).
155. HERMAN, supra note 112, at 59, 95-96.
156. Id. at 78, 84-85 (listing the five methods: ignoring the question and changing the topic,
ruling the question out of bounds, asking a question in response, reframing and answering
a different question, and over- or underanswering).
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3. Using Data to Establish Objective Criteria
One of the core techniques in problem-solving bargaining is to
establish objective criteria by which to judge the fairness of the
offer.157 For example, if an attorney were advising a client about
buying a piece of property, that attorney would look at several
similar pieces of property to determine the market value before
entering the negotiation. Criminal defense lawyers often perform
this analysis in an informal manner by determining the standard
offer for a particular type of charge given the clients criminal his-
tory.158 But are defenders correct in their approximation of the
average offer for a particular situation? And what if the standard
offer changes over time, or from one prosecutor to another? Further,
in many jurisdictions there are exceptions to the standard offer.
What leads to these exceptions? What characteristics of the case,
client, defense attorney, and prosecutor are associated with such
exceptions?
Indigent defender officesdealing with high workloads, low
staffing, and constant underfundingcollect very little data.159
State and federal criminal justice systems do not collect data that
would reveal plea bargaining disparities in like cases, or on aspects
of plea bargaining.160 In particular, these systems data collection on
157. FISHER & URY, supra note 97, at 83-86.
158. See Batra, supra note 4, at 326-27 (noting that counsel has a responsibility to prepare
herself with information on the going price of bargains, but that such information may not
be readily available, although public defenders will potentially have access to the collective
institutional knowledge of their organization).
159. See generally Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1057 (2015) (suggesting a systems approach to tracking and analyzing critical
data to improve indigent defense services); Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement and the
Sixth Amendment Right to Choose (2015) (unpublished manuscript), works.bepress.com/
janet_moore/3/ [https://perma.cc/NA6Q-6KTM] (explaining how the lack of data impacts the
existence and enforcement of standards for attorney qualifications, training, workload, and
performance, which are necessary to fulfill counsels basic duties to communicate, investigate,
and litigate). But see The North Carolina Systems Evaluation Project (NCSEP), N.C. CT. SYS.
OFF. INDIGENTDEF.SERVS., http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/SEP%20
HomePage.html?c=Research%20%20and%20%20Reports,%20Systems%20Evalua
tion%20Project [https://perma.cc/7SBH-S24F] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) ([North Carolina]
created NCSEP to develop performance measures that would evaluate system outcomes and
enable defense agencies to assess, with empirical data, how well the indigent defense system
meets the needs of our clients, the criminal justice system, and the community.).
160. See, e.g., MARK MOTIVANS, BJS, DOJ, NCJ 248493, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2011-2012, at 18-20 (2015) http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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misdemeanors (the vast majority of criminal prosecutions) is woe-
fully inadequate.161
As a threshold matter, defender offices need to collectand, in
many jurisdictions, start to collectbetter data to support their
plea negotiations. To decide which data to collect, defenders should
ask themselves, among other things: What information would be
most useful for plea bargaining purposes, and how would one gather
that information? For example, attorneys within a jurisdiction will
begin to know specific prosecutors, their concerns and interests,
their pet peeves, and the circumstances under which they are more
lenient. Offices might collect data about particular prosecutors
offers made to defendants with similar criminal histories for certain
offenses.162 Offices might also acquire information about whether a
particular prosecutor has a big trial day approaching. If defenders
share this type of information, they have another tool in the plea-
bargaining kit during that window. But information should not be
shared simply on an individual, informal basis; indeed, that already
happens to some degree.163 Part of the challenge for data collection
is establishing a set of routines for sharing information. For ex-
ample, an office could use a single database with periodic briefings
and constant access to disseminate the data. In short, data will be
most effective if it is gathered and shared systematically.164
After data collection begins, defenders need to be trained in
how to use this data in negotiations. Use of this data is undoubted-
ly tricky for public defenders, as they are repeat players who often
4EX4-6BRN]; Data andProduct Finder, BJS, https://bjs.gov/latestreleases.cfm [https://perma.
cc/A8FN-ZYGE] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); see also Bibas, supra note 10, at 2466 n.9
(discussing guilty plea statistics and noting that, [t]hough it is impossible to be sure, most
of these pleas probably resulted from plea bargains).
161. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICAS BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS
10-13 (2009) (indicating that there has been minimal research on misdemeanor courts, despite
the fact that most prosecutions are for misdemeanors, and that there is a particular need for
attentive defenders for misdemeanor defendants).
162. Cf. Batra, supra note 4, at 333 (A database of past plea-bargaining options would give
access to information that some lawyers may know, but overburdened or newer less exper-
ienced lawyers may not. It may also increase the efficiency of plea-bargaining, giving both
prosecutors and defense counsel an easy starting point for particular negotiations.) (footnotes
omitted).
163. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 159, at 1067-71.
2016] TRAINING FOR BARGAINING 1491
negotiate with the same prosecutors.165 Using offers in other clients
cases as a data point in a negotiation could backfire, making offers
for everyone worse. Public defender offices would also have to grap-
ple with whether attorneys should negotiate on behalf of individual
clients or for all of the offices clients.166 Of course, many of these
issues also arise in sentencing advocacy and other areas of practice
not only when communicating with prosecutors, but also when
communicating with judges. Indeed, more systematic approaches to
training and information-sharing about a particular judges sentenc-
ing approachesand about whether the judge pushes prosecutors
to offer better bargains or punishes defendants who do not accept
early offersare also relevant to more effective plea bargaining. Too
often, defenders share this information only anecdotally or incom-
pletely.
D. Additional Training (and Hiring) Considerations
There are myriad other negotiation skills relevant to plea bar-
gaining, all suggesting potential training topics. Although full
exploration of those skills is beyond the scope of this Article, this
final Section briefly sketches out a few additional areas worthy of
training consideration and notes how negotiation skills could also
be taken into account in the defender hiring process.
1. Negotiating in Person Versus Other Methods of
Communication
In negotiation, communication media influence not only what in-
formation is shared and how that information is communicated, but
also how information is received and interpreted.167 About a quarter
of the survey respondents reported that they sometimes, often, or
always use text messages as their medium of communication for
165. See supra text accompanying note 101.
166. See John H. Blume, How the Shackles of Individual Ethics Prevents Structural
Reform in the American Criminal Justice System 9-10, 16 (Jan. 26, 2015) (unpublished manu-
script), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570383 [https://perma.cc/7EQS-
USK6].
167. Noam Ebner et al., Youve Got Agreement: Negoti@ting via Email, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POLY 427, 429 (2010) (footnote omitted).
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plea bargaining. While some of this change is inevitable given tech-
nological advances and generational shifts, defenders should not be
blind to the potential effects on negotiation outcomes. For one ob-
vious example, it is difficult to imagine how a defense attorney
might inform the prosecutor about a defendants individual circum-
stances by text message. But the mode of negotiation also has more
subtle effects on the outcome of the negotiation, and training would
heighten awareness of such effects and the need to account for
them.
The study of texting in negotiations is at its inception. For ex-
ample, one study looks at text messaging in crisis negotiations.168 In
the law enforcement context, officers are increasingly being called
upon to defuse violent, unpredictable situations through the typed
word. Experts say its happened enough in the last five years to
warrant new, specialized training.169
There is a more developed body of work on the effects of negotiat-
ing by e-mail.170 Insight from this literature is relevant to texting.
E-mail negotiation differs from face-to-face negotiation in a number
of ways.171 For example, in e-negotiation:
[T]he social presence of others is reduced and the perceived
social distance among negotiators increases. Thus, negotiators
social awareness of each other may be seriously diminished
when communicating through email. This might explain why
168. Louise Almond & Marc Budden, The Use of Text Messages Within a Crisis Negotiation:
Help or Hindrance?, 12 J. POLICE CRISIS NEGOTS. 1, 1 (2012) (This exploratory study aims to
examine the use of text messaging as a communication method within crisis negotiations and
draws upon the knowledge and experiences of trained crisis negotiators from around the
world.).
169. Carolyn Thompson, Police: Texts OK in Crisis Negotiation, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May
12, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/398533/news/police-texts-ok-in-crisis-negoti
ation.html [https://perma.cc/BT52-RR9S].
170. See, e.g., Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating via Information Technology:
Theory and Application, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 109, 109 (2002) ([We] examine how people
negotiate via e-mail and in particular, how the process and outcomes of e-negotiations differ
from those of traditional face-to-face bargaining.); cf. Aimee L. Drolet & Michael W. Morris,
Rapport in Conflict Resolution: Accounting for How Face-to-Face Contact Fosters Mutual
Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Conflicts, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 (2000) (com-
paring the rapport and cooperation found during in-person interactions with the more
competitive, distrustful, and contentious atmosphere during telephone communication).
171. See, e.g., Drolet & Morris, supra note 170, at 46; Thompson & Nadler, supra note 170,
at 155-20.
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e-negotiators feel less bound by normatively appropriate behav-
ior than face-to-face negotiators apparently do. This weakening
of the normative fabric translates into an increased tendency to
make threats and issue ultimata, to adopt contentious, squeaky
wheel behavior, to lie or deceive, [and] to confront each other
negatively.172
These insights go well beyond the purely descriptive. One group of
scholars outlined a framework for understanding the specific
elements of communication that are most altered in the shift from
in-person conversation to exchange of email messages.173 They then
explored five major implications of these differences for negotiating
via e-mail and suggest[ed] four basic skill sets that e-mail negotia-
tors need to acquire in order to cope with these implications.174
As with other aspects of negotiation, there is training to be done
on how the mode of communication can influence a plea negotiation.
Only by understanding these effects can counsel make an informed
decision about which modetext, e-mail, phone call, or face-to-
facewill help get the desired outcome in the negotiation.
2. Law and Ethics of Plea Bargaining
Perhaps the most obvious areas for training on negotiations in
criminal cases, at least for lawyers, are the law and ethics of plea
bargaining. Since these core areas include mandatory rules for at-
torneysin theory, even if too often not in practiceit makes sense
to train on them.
The Supreme Court instituted a new era of plea-bargaining regu-
lation with its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, followed by
Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye in 2012.175 Yet this regulation
172. Ebner et al., supra note 167, at 436 (footnotes omitted); see also Matt Richtel, The
Mouth Is Mightier than the Pen, N.Y.TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
28/business/the-mouth-is-mightier-than-the-pen.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2JF6-9EVF]
(New research shows that text-based communications may make individuals sound less intel-
ligent and employable than when the same information is communicated orally. The findings
imply that old-fashioned phone conversations or in-person visits may be more effective when
trying to impress a prospective employer or, perhaps, close a deal.).
173. Ebner et al., supra note 167, at 429.
174. Id.
175. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012);
Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010).
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is still at the margins. It focuses largely on the flow of information
between defendants and their lawyers, not the exchange between
prosecutors and defenders during negotiations.176 Although federal
right-to-counsel norms mandate that defenders function effectively
in the plea-bargaining context,177 the Court has thus far only ad-
dressed relatively narrow instances of ineffectiveness: failing to
communicate an offer to a client;178 giving egregiously erroneous
legal advice that led the defendant to reject a favorable plea offer;179
and failing to properly advise a client that a guilty plea will lead to
certain deportation.180 Lower federal and state constitutional deci-
sions address a broader range of alleged ineffectiveness scenarios,
and may suggest other areas for training about plea-bargaining law.
For example, Massachusetts imposes a duty to negotiate so as to
avoid deportation consequences in some contexts,181 and several
jurisdictions require counsel to advise clients about placement on a
sex offender registration as a consequence of a guilty plea.182 State
statutes, professional standards, and some court rules also address
plea bargaining.183
The ethics of plea bargaining is a wide-ranging, well-developed
field that suggests a number of areas for potential training.184
Consider Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1, Truthfulness in
Statements to Others, which prohibits lawyers from mak[ing] a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person during
representation of a client.185 As all law school students know from
a basic ethics class, this rather general rule can be interpreted in a
number of ways. For example, information like a partys intentions
176. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384-91; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407-11; Padilla, 599 U.S. at 374.
177. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Alkon, supra note 9, at 594-98;
Batra, supra note 4, at 319-22; Roberts, supra note 4, at 2665-69.
178. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
179. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383-84, 1388.
180. See Padilla, 599 U.S. at 366, 376.
181. Commonwealth v. Marinho, 981 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Mass. 2013).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 71 M.J. 138, 144 (C.A.A.F. 2012); Taylor v. State, 698
S.E.2d 384, 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
183. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyers Obligation to Be Trustworthy
When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 185-86, 188-89 (1981); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 153, 166-68 (1999).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASSN 2014).
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as to an acceptable settlement is excepted from the rule because
it is not treated as a fact.186 Beyond these basic understandings,
there is much study and commentary about ethical considerations
such as the line between lyinga prohibited misrepresentation 187
and puffing.188
Some of these rules and norms are already part of defender train-
ing. There is clearly room for more training on the law and ethics of
plea bargaining, but it should not come at the expense of much-
needed training about other, less obvious (and less comfortable)
negotiation skills.
3. Hiring Better Negotiators
In the hiring interview process, many public defender offices test
applicants interviewing, counseling, issue spotting, and oral ad-
vocacy skills through simulations and hypotheticals.189 These offices
also routinely ask references about applicants abilities in these
areas. Very few offices test or ask about negotiation skills.190
Given defender offices scarce resources and limited time avail-
able for training, those offices might consider negotiation skills and
exposure to negotiation in law school during the hiring process. This
should not replace training because, after all, law schools do not
offer many courses in the area,191 and many references will be un-
able to speak to this skill set. It is nonetheless worth inquiring and
perhaps posing a hypothetical or conducting a simulation during the
interview process. In addition to evaluating the applicants skill set,
considering negotiation skills and exposure would send a message
to future defenders that the ability to negotiate matters in effective
defense representation.
186. Id. at cmt. 2.
187. See id. at cmt. 1.
188. See, e.g., Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8
REV. LITIG. 173, 183-84 (1989) (using an example scenario to draw distinctions between lying
and puffing); see also Hazard, supra note 184, at 188-89, 196; Menkel-Meadow, supra note
184, at 166-68.
189. See, e.g., Nicole Vikan & Jory H. Fisher, The Criminal Hypothetical and Other Unique
Aspects of the Criminal Law Interview Process, NALP BULL. (2006).
190. Cf. id. (recommending several skills for public defender interviewees to focus on, which
do not include negotiation).
191. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Although a business school student would be hard-pressed to
graduate without studying negotiation in a variety of contexts,192
most law schools offer only a seminar or a few courses that touch on
the topic.193 As for the rightful place of negotiation in the criminal
justice curriculum, legal academics wonder if the topic offers enough
substance to support more than a few minutes of coverage.194 These
192. See Ebner et al., supra note 167, at 427 (Students of negotiation in business schools
are trained to recognize and take part in a wide range of negotiation settings, including their
own salary and benefits negotiations, intra-organizational negotiations ..., inter-organiza-
tional negotiations ..., and others.); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Crisis in Legal Education or the
Other Things Law Students Should Be Learning and Doing, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 133, 136
n.18 (2013) (When I was a visiting professor of law at Harvard ten years ago, I spent a good
deal of my time looking at the more modern, adaptive, and internationalized curricula at the
[Business] [S]chool, where I was privileged to participate in classes and faculty working
groups in ethics, negotiation, and organizational development.).
193. See CRAVER, supra note 138, at 61 (Most attorneys have not had formal negotiation
courses. For many years, most law schools refused to offer such skills courses. In recent years,
most schools have added negotiation courses to their alternative dispute resolution curricula,
but these tend to be limited enrollment classes that are only taken by a few students.); see
also Doyel, supra note 23, at 1023 (noting in a study examining defense counsels pretrial
litigation skills that although most law schools now have extensive trial practice offerings,
fewer offer sufficient instruction in the so-called office skills). A search of the course cata-
logues of four randomly chosen law schools from different regions supports this dearth of
negotiation courses. The authors reviewed course catalogues from the law schools at the
University of Arizona, the University of Oregon, the University of Pennsylvania, and Stetson
University. In the broadest sense, these programs offered an average of only four courses
covering negotiation theory, skills, and associated topics. See Course Catalog, U. OR. SCH. L.,
https://law.uoregon.edu/course-catalog [https://perma.cc/ZXB9-ZNAD] (last visited Mar. 20,
2016) (displaying courses for the 2015-2016 academic year, including five courses of note: ADR
Strategies in Litigation, Negotiation, Mediation, Small Claims Mediation Clinic, and Criminal
Adjudication); Course Descriptions, STETSON U., http://www.stetson.edu/law/offices/registrar/
course-descriptions.php/ [https://perma.cc/UA56-SP3N] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (displaying
all course listings, including seven courses of note: Comparative Negotiation and Mediation,
Criminal ProcedureAdjudication, Family Law Litigation, Family Law Mediation, Florida
Criminal Procedure, Mediation Skills Training, Negotiation and Mediation); Course Finder:
Browse Courses, U. PA. L. SCH., https://goat.law.upenn.edu/cf/coursefinder/browse/?page=2
[https://perma.cc/ND8T-9KY8] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (displaying courses for the 2015-
2016 academic year, including three courses of note: Criminal Procedure: Prosecution and
Adjudication, Mediation Clinic, and Negotiation and Dispute Resolution); Course Schedule for
Spring 2016, U. ARIZ. JAMES E. ROGERS C. L., http://law2.arizona.edu/current_students/
academic_programs/currentschedule.cfm?semester=s16 [https://perma.cc/78PJ-MRQZ] (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015) (displaying courses for the Spring 2016 semester, including two courses
of note: Negotiation of Employment Agreements and Separation Agreements, and Mediation).
194. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
2016] TRAINING FOR BARGAINING 1497
attitudes mirror reactions that we encountered in a number of field
interviews about plea bargaining preparation, training, and prac-
tice; attorneys repeatedly told us that you just cannot teach or learn
how to be a good negotiator.
This poor educational foundation has consequences in the field,
where defense attorneys remain blind to possible negotiation suc-
cesses. One head public defender bemoaned the fact that criminal
defense training doggedly continues to focus on trial technique, to
the exclusion of pretrial and plea practice. We, as criminal defense
lawyers, doggedly continue to focus on trial performance as the
ultimate measure of our lawyering skills.195
A few public defender offices have a perceived culture of reluc-
tantly pleading cases and happily going to trial. A corollary of this
fighting mentality, at times, is to celebrate acquittals but never
good negotiation outcomes. Many other public defender offices have
an unfortunate culture of pushing guilty pleas, probably due to high
workloads. The former attitude devalues good case outcomes that
are gained through skilled negotiations; the latter tends to hew to
the negotiation-is-begging view196 of the criminal defense lawyers
role. For both prosecutors and defenders, and other system stake-
holders, the mere fact of training in negotiation will highlight how
negotiation is a skill that can be learned, and how utilizing negotia-
tion techniques can lead to better outcomes.197
Changing the cultural attitude to treat effective negotiation as a
lawyering success is a long-term battle. It must start in legal edu-
cation and continue in the design of training for public defenders
and other criminal defense attorneys. As our field study data show,
negotiation training is still generations behind. Training modules
have not yet caught up to the reality that negotiation is at the
center of criminal practice. The responses to the survey, combined
with the interviews and published training agendas, reveal that
public defenders receive only limited training on negotiation skills,
as opposed to trial skills, when they first enter their offices. The
195. Hernandez & Powell, supra note 131, at 2365.
196. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
197. The outcome might be better only for one side (perhaps the side that negotiates most
effectively). But given opportunities for integrative bargaining, the outcome might be better
for both the prosecution and defendant. See supra Part III.A; supra text accompanying notes
100-03.
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topic of negotiation is even less prominent for public defenders in
their continuing legal education, even as trial skills continue to
receive attention.
The near invisibility of negotiation skills in public defenders
training appears to have an impact on their representation of
clients. Defense attorneys normally do not engage in the sort of
deliberate and consultative preparation for plea negotiations that
is routine for cases that are headed for trial.198 Moreover, defense
attorney descriptions of the negotiation process suggest that they do
not act on the insights of negotiation theory that produce meas-
urable results in other contexts. For instance, defense attorneys
appear to make relatively little use of anchoring through presenting
first offers and low offers.199
One theme we heard in our interviews is the defenders aware-
ness of prosecutor power, applicable across the board: I think that
the prosecutor certainly feels that they have the upper hand in most
cases .... [M]ost defense attorneys in most cases, feel as though they
are [at] the disadvantage that they have less to leverage, they have
less to work with.200 However brutally realistic this view of the
world, it saps the life from a vigorous defense. The grandest ambi-
tion for a training program that is savvy about negotiation theory
and practice goes beyond better results in a few cases. Its deepest
effects would be to celebrate negotiation successes and to turn
around a defeatist mindset.
198. See supra Part II.B.3; supra note 114 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part III.C.1.
200. Interview with H, supra note 63.
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APPENDIX: SELECTED QUESTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE COUNSEL
SURVEY
Section 1: Background Questions
The following questions are about you and your background.
Questions about your work history refer to after law school gradua-
tion only.
How long have you worked in this Public Defenders Office? 
_____ years
How many years total have you worked as a criminal defense
attorney?
_____ years
Before coming to this Public Defenders Office, did you ever
work as a prosecutor?
A. Yes
B. No
What percentage of your current caseload falls into each of the
following categories (adds up to 100)?
Misdemeanors ____
Juvenile ____
Traffic ____
General Felony ____
Specialized Felony Unit ____
Other ____
What is your gender?
Male
Female
Optional: What is your racial and ethnic background? (Check
all that apply.):
African-American
Asian
Hispanic
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White, not Hispanic
Native American or Pacific Islander
Other (including more than one race)
Section 2: Negotiation Practices
Frequency of Negotiated Pleas
In your estimation, how often do your clients get a higher sen-
tence after trial than they probably would have received after
a guilty plea, assuming the offense/s of conviction are the same
at trial and after a plea?
[Never, Infrequently, Sometimes, Usually, Always]
Factors that Influence Negotiations
How important to the outcome of a negotiation are each of the
following factors when you are discussing potential dispositions
with a prosecutor?
[1 = not important at all, 2 = relatively unimportant, 3 =
moderately important, 4 = relatively important, 5 = extremely
important]
Category/type of case (e.g., drugs, property, robbery).
Your clients criminal history.
Strength or weakness of any suppression issues.
Probability of conviction on all charges if case were to go to
trial.
Your knowledge of the relevant legal issues.
Your knowledge of the relevant facts.
The number of cases on the prosecutors docket along with
this case.
The number of cases you are defending at the same time as
this case.
Relevant collateral consequences of a conviction for your
client (e.g., immigration, public housing, occupational
license).
Whether client is currently in custody.
What your client wants and needs.
Your knowledge of alternatives to incarceration.
Sentence range under state law for negotiated plea.
Law enforcement witnesss wishes (in cases with law 
enforcement witness).
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Victims wishes (in cases involving victim).
Application of prosecutor office-wide policy related to this
type of charge or defendant.
What the judge is likely to do at sentencing in cases like this.
Prosecutors personality. 
Prosecutors reputation as a trial attorney.
Prosecutors reputation as a negotiator.
Your personality.
Your reputation as a trial attorney.
Your reputation as a negotiator.
Your relationship with the prosecutor assigned to the case.
How often do the following statements about the timing of ne-
gotiations play out in plea bargaining?
[never, infrequently, sometimes, usually, always]
Prosecution initiates the bargaining process.
Prosecution makes the first concrete offer (as to either the
count for a plea or the agreed-upon sentence).
Client accepts first offer from prosecutor.
In cases where prosecution makes first concrete offer, you
make counter-offer.
In cases where you make first concrete offer, prosecutor
makes counter-offer.
Prosecutor makes take it or leave it offer.
Prosecutor sets expiration date for offer (as opposed to
leaving it open until trial or not mentioning any deadline).
You initiate the bargaining process.
There is no negotiation at all.
For the most common type of case that you handle, how would
you characterize the prosecutors typical first offer? (Check
one.):
Highly unfavorable to the defendant.
Somewhat unfavorable to the defendant.
Reasonable.
Somewhat favorable to the defendant.
Highly favorable to the defendant.
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For the most common type of case that you handle, how would
you characterize your typical first offer? (Check one.):
Highly unfavorable to the defendant.
Somewhat unfavorable to the defendant.
Reasonable.
Somewhat favorable to the defendant.
Highly favorable to the defendant.
Estimate the total time you spend on all bargaining discussions
or exchanges with the prosecution in a typical case:
____ Less than 5 minutes.
____ 5-15 minutes.
____ 15-30 minutes.
____ 30-60 minutes.
____ More than 60 minutes.
How often do you use the following channels of communication
with the prosecution during plea negotiations?
[Never, Infrequently, Sometimes, Usually, Always]
Email (including offer letter attachment).
Phone.
In person, in the office.
In person, in the courtroom.
Text message.
Letter (by fax or mail).
Other: _______.
Section 3: Preparation for Bargaining
For the following questions related to preparation for bargaining,
please answer with reference to the most common level of cases that
you handle.
How often do you engage in the following activities as you
prepare for any bargaining session in a typical case?
[Never, Infrequently, Sometimes, Usually, Always]
File review.
Interview defense witnesses.
Interview prosecution witnesses.
Investigation of crime scene.
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Legal research.
Asking witnesses how they feel about particular plea out-
comes.
Asking the client how he/she feels about various potential
plea outcomes.
Discussing or mooting negotiation with colleague or supervi-
sor.
Exploring relevant collateral consequences to structure pleas
to avoid or minimize them.
How often do you meet with a supervisor before bargaining
begins to review your preparations?
Never.
Infrequently.
In about half of my cases.
Frequently.
Always.
Section 4: Training about Negotiation
How many days of new attorney training did the office or
affiliated organizations provide for you at the time you were
first hired? _____
Of the training noted above, what percentage related specifi-
cally to negotiation skills and preparation for bargaining? _____
As part of your new attorney training, how many hours did you
spend observing an experienced attorney engaged in plea
negotiations? ____
After the period of new attorney training, in a typical year, how
many hours of training (in-house or external) do you receive
that focus on negotiation skills? ____
[If the answer to the previous question is > 0, this follow-up
question appears:]
What percentage of those hours was provided during in-house
training programs? ___
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At any time while working in your current office, have you ever
received any written training materials that relate specifically
to negotiation skills or plea bargaining?
A. Yes
B. No
[If the answer to the previous question is Yes, this follow-up
question appears:]
Have you ever consulted or referred to those materials after the
time of the training?
A. Yes
B. No
